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Abstract 
 
 The main purpose of this work is to undermine the fact-value distinction as it is presented 
in the work of Max Weber, and also to provide an outline for an empathic sociology that can 
replace public sociology by shifting the focus of sociological research from the public sphere to 
abject material suffering. To do this I will be providing a critical explication of Weber’s 
methodological writings. I will also construct a notion of empathy using contemporary research 
in social psychology, as well as the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul 
Sartre. I will then use this notion to argue that empathic sociology is based upon principles that 
allow for a research method focussed on social change that is not susceptible to the limitations of 
the fact-value distinction.   
 
Keywords: Max Weber, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Pierre Bourdieu, empathy, 
social psychology, public sociology, phenomenology, social suffering. 
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Introduction 
The tremendous successes that the natural sciences have enjoyed during the 
twentieth century were the consequence of the usefulness of their results; science does 
not simply tell us how the natural world works, but also allows us to figure out what we 
can do with such knowledge. If science had not provided us with such astounding 
technical facility, it is unlikely that it would have infiltrated the world of human practice 
to the extent that it has, or that it would have gained such authority over that practice. In 
short, its success is the result of its utility. As a self-proclaimed “social science,” 
sociology has often not followed suit; if a sociologist happens to meet someone other 
than a colleague or student who actually knows what sociology is, it is even more 
unlikely that he will be able to tell you what it is good for. This is because, during the 
early stages of the development of sociology as a discipline,  many sociologists were in 
agreement that  sociology should be exclusively concerned with the question of how the 
social world works, as well as the discovery of its underlying causes and the explication 
of its laws. The question of what society should look like was deemed a separate 
question, one that was not within the purview of sociology. This meant that the role of the 
sociologist did not extend beyond the collection of social data and the intellectual task of 
making that data intelligible to an academic community. Any application of research 
findings to social problems was said to be a job for activists, social workers or policy-
makers; the normative task of the progressive reconstruction of society was not the 
sociologist’s responsibility as a scientist.  
Max Weber was largely responsible for the popularization of this segregation; it is 
explicitly called for in several of his most well-known essays and lectures (see Weber 
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1949; 1958). Weber was responsible for introducing what has come to be known as the 
“fact-value distinction” to sociology, and also developed a notion of Verstehen, or 
“understanding” as a method by which the sociologist can grasp the intentions and 
motivations of social actors. The fact-value distinction was posed as a logical problem, a 
claim that sociologists must not confuse descriptive statements with value judgements, 
defined as both  “practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory nature of 
phenomena subject to our influence,” and as those evaluations “regarding the desirability 
or undesirability of social facts from ethical, cultural or other points of view” (1949a: 1). 
Simply put, the sociologist can make claims as to what is based on verifiable evidence, 
but cannot make claims as to how things ought to exist in society, since it is impossible to 
verify such claims. As for Verstehen, what Weber calls “emotionally empathic” 
understanding is meant to be used in a rational manner; empathy is seen strictly as a 
means to understanding the other’s behaviours, not as a phenomenon that might 
potentially form bonds between individuals. Weber’s methods are thus meant to keep the 
sociologist not just from passing judgement on the socio-economic conditions of the 
research subject’s life, but also to keep him from intervening in that life.      
During the twentieth century, a number of thinkers sought to oppose Weber’s 
view that sociologists could not be involved in engendering progressive social change in 
society through their research. One particularly well-known group of such thinkers are 
the Frankfurt School critical theorists. For the early critical theorist Max Horkheimer, the 
“social totality” possesses a “two-sided character” that is characterized by the human 
world of “will and reason” on the one hand, a world that is the product of the conscious 
and directed work of cooperative individuals. On the other hand, society is also 
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“comparable to nonhuman natural processes, to pure mechanisms, because cultural forms 
which are supported by war and oppression are not the creations of a unified, self-
conscious will. That world is not their own but the world of capital” (Horkheimer 2012 
[1937]: 430). Only those who possess a “critical attitude” towards the society of which 
they are a part are consciously aware of this dialectical tension. Horkheimer argues that 
most sociologists do not possess such an attitude; in their roles as scientists they see 
society as “extrinsic” to themselves, while as citizens they show an active interest in the 
issues and problems of society. However, these two roles are not unified in practice, and 
it is one of the tasks of critical thinking to overcome this separation: “Critical 
thinking…is motivated…by the effort…to transcend the tension and to abolish the 
opposition between the individual’s purposefulness, spontaneity, and rationality, and 
those work-process relationships on which society is built. Critical thought has a concept 
of man as in conflict with himself until this opposition is removed” (431). There is thus a 
distinct difference between the kind of sociology that Horkheimer advocates and the 
more “traditional” approach to sociology of the “scientific specialist” advocated by 
Weber: 
 
However many valid analogies there may be between these different intellectual 
endeavours, there is nonetheless a decisive difference when it comes to the relation of 
subject and object…The object with which the scientific specialist deals is not affected at 
all by his own theory. Subject and object are kept strictly apart…the observer as such can 
affect no change in the object. A consciously critical attitude, however, is part of the 
development of society: the construing of the course of history as the necessary product 
of an economic mechanism simultaneously contains both a protest against this order of 
things, a protest generated by the order itself, and the idea of self-determination for the 
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human race, that is the idea of a state of affairs in which man’s actions no longer flow 
from a mechanism but from his own decision…If we think of the object of the theory in 
separation from the theory, we falsify it and fall into quietism or conformism. Every part 
of the theory presupposes the critique of the existing order and the struggle against it 
along the lines determined by the theory itself (436).   
 
Critical theorists are therefore in opposition to the “quietism” of the Weberian researcher 
who sees it as her role to abstain from intervention in the state of affairs of the object 
under study. They instead advocate a critical approach to research that is seen as part of a 
gradual transformation of society that changes it from a society ruled by the dictates of 
capital to one of “self-determination” in which individuals can decide the fate of their 
own society in a collective, democratic fashion. Sociological research thus has an 
emancipatory role, not simply one in which it must act as a vehicle of understanding. 
This role is driven by the “single existential judgement” that, without intervention in the 
progression of capitalism, society will drive itself “into a new barbarism” (435). 
 The later critical theorist Jürgen Habermas created his own brand of critical 
theory. Like the earlier critical theorists, Habermas insisted that purely objective, 
unadulterated scientific knowledge was impossible to obtain. In one of his earlier works 
he identifies three cognitive areas, each with a specific motive that generates knowledge. 
He called one such area “emancipatory knowledge,” which he argued includes criticism 
and utopian thinking (1972). He thought that philosophy played a major role for the 
social sciences because it has the capacity to construct ethical claims and introduce 
normative considerations into the practice of science (Calhoun et al. 2007: 359). 
Habermas’s own such contribution to the social sciences was what he called 
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“communicative rationality.” The concept is based in a universalist moral framework 
dependent upon a “universal pragmatics,” the central claim of which is that all speech 
acts performed by individuals have an inherent telos or end, that being the goal of mutual 
understanding (1979). Habermas unites this idea with his conception of an ideal, modern 
public sphere that facilitates a kind of democratic mediation between groups in a 
technocratic society whose unhindered growth threatens to usurp various cultural 
traditions.          
The sociologist C. Wright Mills also wished to create an approach to sociological 
research that bridged the separation between the researcher and the research subject in 
sociological research. He uses the notion of the sociological imagination to describe the 
intellectual capacity whereby the social researcher can connect the larger structural 
transformations of a society to the problems of individuals in their everyday lives: “It is 
the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most 
intimate features of the human self – and to see the relations between the two. Back of its 
use there is always the urge and the need to know the social and historical meaning of the 
individual in the society and in the period in which he has his quality and his being” 
(2000 [1959]: 7). This is what Mills calls the connection between “history and 
biography,” which is the “task and promise” of the sociological imagination. Mills 
believed that by conducting research in accordance with this “imagination,” sociologists 
could equip the public with the tools for understanding the social and political sources of 
their personal problems, which would in turn transform the political indifference of 
publics “into involvement with public issues” (5). For Mills, alienation, political 
domination, and the “international anarchy” of global politics are both public and private 
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issues that need to be addressed by the sociologist (13). This makes it “the social 
scientist’s foremost political and intellectual task…to make clear the elements of 
contemporary uneasiness and indifference.” This is the “central demand” made on the 
sociologist by other professionals and intellectuals. Mills makes it clear that he believes 
that the social sciences need to adapt “to the cultural tasks of our time,” that they have 
implications for cultural and political life (17). Mills therefore wants to see the discipline 
of sociology enter public affairs, to address the concerns of all individuals within society: 
“I believe that what may be called classic social analysis is a definable and usable set of 
traditions; that its essential feature is the concern with historical social structures; and that 
its problems are of direct relevance to urgent public issues and insistent human troubles” 
(21). There is clearly a public involvement of the sociologist that Mills is characterizing 
in his notion of the sociological imagination. 
The twentieth century thus gave rise to a number of thinkers who insisted that the 
discipline of sociology possessed a role beyond simply creating an understanding of the 
social world. They also insisted upon the normative use of sociology, that as a science it 
possessed the capacity and thus the responsibility to use its knowledge to address the 
many problems of society and change it for the better. Such a task could not be carried 
out in a detached manner, something that these thinkers understood. It instead required an 
active engagement with those individuals and groups that the sociologist sought to 
understand, a dialogical presence in their lives as equals attempting to understand and to 
find solutions to common human problems.  
 The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen the development of a new 
trend in sociological thought that seeks to involve the sociologist with the amelioration of 
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public problems. This trend has been termed “public sociology.” The sociologist Patricia 
Mooney Nickel (2012: 3)  identifies two streams of public sociology that currently exist 
in the United States, one headed by Ben Agger (2000/2007), the other by Michael 
Burawoy (2004a, 2004b; 2005a, 2005b; 2006; 2007a, 2007b; 2009a, 2009b). Agger sums 
up his approach in the following passage: 
 
A sociology is public if it embraces Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, which merges 
theory and practice, and if it recognizes that method doesn’t solve all intellectual 
problems but is merely one form of rhetoric (discourse) among many. A public sociology 
must want to change the world, and it must recognize that it is already changing the 
world by intervening in it. Finally, a public sociology addresses itself to various publics, 
to which it doesn’t condescend but that it seeks to mobilize (270).   
 
For Agger, sociology is meant to be “a mode of writing” that reveals that the perspectives 
of all “objective” sociological research are ultimately subjective in character. Sociologists 
should therefore engage in “self-translation” with a public in mind, and seek to address 
major public issues. According to Nickel, Agger’s aim is not to preserve the discipline of 
sociology per se, but rather to transform sociological discourse. As she explains:  
 
The key point to take from Agger is that, although public intellectuality is important, public 
discourse depends on more than intellectuals speaking authoritatively in public; the conditions for 
public discourse must be cultivated through public writing that challenges the value-neutrality1 of 
knowledge, which is to say that it recognizes that it is one portrayal among many. This mode of 
intellectuality requires that sociologists reveal in dialogue with the public that the production of 
                                                 
1
 Based on Nickel’s reading of Agger, he seems to be using the terms “objectivity” and “value-neutrality” 
interchangeably, referring to the general process by which many sociologists seek to extract any traces of 
subjective bias from the presentation of their research. For the purposes of this essay, we will elaborate on 
the Weberian understanding of these terms in chapter one. 
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knowledge involves individual passions about its reception; we cannot help but infuse the 
knowledge that we produce with our own purpose…Although my account might be empirically 
accurate, it remains the outcome of my value-laden choice of what to portray as important. 
Revealing this fact leaves open a space for my readers to contest my framing and thus instigates 
knowledge (Nickel 2012: 4). 
 
Nickel is here obviously emphasizing the point made by Agger that knowledge is always 
ultimately value-laden, meaning that it is saturated with the intentions, motivations and 
biases of the researcher. For Agger, this is an epistemological reality from which it is 
impossible to escape; the positivistic, “purist” ideal of a form of knowledge purged of all 
subjective proclivities is one that can no longer be seriously entertained. Nickel claims 
that it is on this point that Agger bases his conception of public sociology. Agger argues 
that the individual researcher must accept that his research is value-laden, a condition that 
is essential for a public discourse on sociological research in which the public is capable 
of critiquing and contesting the claims of the sociologist. The public must therefore be 
informed of this aspect of research, since only then can they be properly equipped with 
the tools necessary in order to participate in a discussion  about social issues that are 
directly relevant to their lives.The key to a public sociology then, for Agger, is for public 
sociology to generate a space in which the public can participate in the critique of social 
knowledge in order to extract results that have the potential to have a productive 
application judged as appropriate to contemporary social issues.    
Michael Burawoy’s approach to public sociology is perhaps more well-known 
than Agger’s. On the surface, his idea of a public sociology is very similar in intent to 
Agger’s. The key difference is that he seeks to preserve “traditional” sociology while at 
the same time carving out a space for a sociology that is resolutely and uncontroversially 
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public. He centers this argument around his notion of a “sociological division of labour,” 
which categorizes what he sees as four distinct types of sociology that are mutually 
beneficial to one another in their respective aims. They arise from the interaction of the 
production of two different types of knowledge that are essentially aimed at two different 
types of audiences. Thus we have the production of both “instrumental” and “reflexive” 
knowledge for either an “academic” or an “extra-academic” audience. The first type of  
sociology is “professional” sociology, which produces instrumental knowledge that is 
meant for an academic audience. Professional sociology is meant to carry out “multiple 
research programs” and ultimately provides the knowledge base for all of the other types 
of sociology (2007: 32-33). It could therefore be considered synonymous with 
“traditional” sociology, since it preserves all forms of existing research methods so that 
any of them might be used in any way that is necessary for a given research purpose. 
Burawoy’s second type of sociology is “policy” sociology, which like professional 
sociology produces instrumental knowledge, but is intended for application in an extra-
academic setting. It is “sociology in the service of a goal defined by a client.” It is 
essentially meant to provide solutions to problems that have been presented to the 
sociologist, or to legitimate solutions that have already been reached by any of the parties 
involved. This can involve anything from testimony in court to investigating the causes of 
poverty or terrorism for the government. It is thus similar to the profession of consulting, 
and is therefore enacted within a bureaucratic setting. Burawoy’s third type of sociology 
is termed “critical” sociology, and is meant to provide “critical” knowledge intended for 
an academic audience. It is the task of this type of sociology to examine the foundations 
of the research programs of professional sociology, thus acting as a sort of critical and 
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self-conscious vanguard to the discipline. It is described by Burawoy as the “conscience” 
of professional sociology, “promoting new research programs built on alternative 
foundations.” Burawoy sees critical sociology as addressing two major questions, namely 
“sociology for whom?” (who are we addressing in our research?) and “sociology for 
what?” (should we be concerned with the ends of society, or only with the means to reach 
those ends?). It can therefore also be seen as a kind of bridge between professional and 
the final and fourth type of sociology, which is public sociology. This is a sociology 
concerned with producing reflexive knowledge for an extra-academic audience. Burawoy 
claims that the “core activity” of public sociology is “the dialogue between sociologists 
and their publics” (36). Burawoy describes it much like a political discussion, since 
values are not automatically shared by both sides. The ultimate goal is simply to establish 
a conversation, to enrich public debate on moral and political issues by informing them 
with sociological theory and research. The claim is made by Burawoy that, as distinctive 
to the other social sciences, sociology’s specific contribution lies in its relation to civil 
society, and therefore in its defence of human interests against the encroachment of states 
and markets (2004a).  
It is therefore evident that, although there are many superficial similarities 
between Agger’s and Burawoy’s respective approaches to the development of a public 
sociology, there are also many subtle differences. Burawoy’s approach can be seen as 
much more diplomatic in character, since he attempts to establish a position for every 
form of sociology without necessarily being critical of any of them. He therefore 
harbours a place for professional and public sociology, implicitly claiming that it’s 
possible for them to “just be friends” without admitting that it is a political disjuncture 
11 
 
 
 
between advocates of professional versus those of public sociology that give rise to the 
problematic of a public sociology to begin with. We therefore cannot realistically say that 
we can recognize them within  a framework that sees them as mutually beneficial, since it 
is the epistemological and methodological fissures between the two that have sustained 
only a formal cohesion between the advocates of both. It seems as though Agger would 
recognize this, since he begins from a fundamentally different epistemological standpoint 
that does not attempt to reconcile the differences between meta-sociological standpoints. 
It is this standpoint that gives Agger a much more egalitarian approach, since it insists on 
the reality of “knowledge sharing” between academia and publics, and allows both 
groups to critique these respective knowledges. Burawoy, although with the best of 
intentions, stays within the safety of an elitist enclosure where the sociologist “informs” 
the public and establishes an unequal dialogue. The intentions of these public sociologies 
are similar, but there is still much contention as to what exactly constitutes its 
foundations.  
It is clear that there exists a long tradition of thinkers in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries who have sought to oppose the Weberian separation between the researcher 
and the object of study, understood in the sense that the researcher cannot obtain clear, 
intelligible data about the social phenomena under study if he possesses a vested interest 
in improving the research subject’s quality of life by altering the social conditions that 
affect him. My own thesis is also meant to oppose Weber’s claims. Before I present my 
thesis, however, I would like to provide a brief summary of an area of research on “social 
suffering,” as my own thesis is intended to be a contribution to this literature.    
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Social Suffering 
“Social suffering” is a topic of sociological research that was established in and 
has grown since the 1990s (Kleinman 1995, 1996; Kleinman et al. 1997; Bourdieu et al. 
1999; Frank 2001; Morgan and Wilkinson 2001; Wilkinson 2005, 2012). The research on 
social suffering that currently exists can be topically divided into four subgroups 
(Wilkinson 2005). First, social suffering appears as a focus of study in medical 
anthropology. According to Wilkinson, the ultimate goal of research in this area is to 
account for the sociocultural elements of the experience of pain. This literature generally 
appears as a critique of biomedical accounts of pain that are interpreted within a 
Cartesian framework, one that ignores the social contexts and cultural meanings that 
characterize experiences of pain. It is generally argued here that the diagnostic language 
of medicine must incorporate the lived experience of suffering in order to gain a fuller 
medical understanding of bodily pain. Second, there has been an attempt to give formal 
expression to suffering using ethnography. This is largely a political endeavour, as it is 
thought that by designating the cultural consequences of suffering, a larger place can be 
carved out for it as a matter of public concern. It is also thought that this public 
acknowledgement might engender a sense of justice and a chance to heal for those who 
have actually experienced abject suffering. Thirdly, for the same political reasons that 
ethnographers have begun to document instances of social suffering, researchers have 
also begun to study the role of mass media in the development of moral consciousness 
and humanitarian incentives. The results have led researchers to believe that the media 
has not properly conveyed the cultural meanings attached to instances of human 
suffering, and has allowed people to easily turn their backs to the suffering of others. 
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There is as of yet no consensus as to what alternative would take the place of this 
phenomenon, however there is widespread agreement that the media has been largely 
responsible for creating and sustaining a cultural politics of compassion which has the 
potential to be understood and pursued further. Finally, their exists an ever-growing 
literature on sociological studies of the Holocaust. With the exception of the writings of 
the German political philosopher Hannah Arendt, there exist virtually no studies of the 
Holocaust in the first twenty years following the war. It is only recently that a growing 
number of social scientists have sought to confront the difficulties involved in 
understanding such a phenomenon. By making more explicit the quality of suffering 
undergone by victims of such atrocities, it is the hope of these scholars that we can invent 
new modes of representation that address the insufficiencies of our current categories in 
allowing us to understand what such events reveal about the human moral condition.  
As can be derived from this account of the literature on social suffering, these 
four separate “streams” of literature share several goals in common. One is to study “the 
actual quality of the lived experience of suffering,” as well as what this experience 
actually does to people (Wilkinson 2005). It is argued that previous accounts of such 
research have left out the “human significance” of such events, and although we have 
more information than ever before on catastrophic social realities like poverty and war, 
the actual experience of these events has not been well documented. It is also thought that 
engagement in such research will give rise to issues that will allow scholars to reappraise 
“the moral and political value of contemporary social science.” It is also hoped that 
research in this area can be used to inform policy decisions, as they can provide a deeper 
understanding of some of the consequences of certain policy choices. It therefore 
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immediately becomes evident that the aims of public sociology and the study of social 
suffering share a number of characteristics in common. Whereas public sociology seeks 
to establish a legitimate area of scholarship that studies social problems with the aim of 
ameliorating them by altering the socioeconomic conditions that allow for their 
reproduction, the study of social suffering is at least aimed at generating a discussion of 
such a project, and at the very least seeks to inform policy-making and implementation in 
a way that will reshape it. As mentioned above, the ethnographic enterprise concerned 
with social suffering is not only conducted on behalf of the injustices faced by the 
subjects of study, but is also conducted with the aim of opening a space for a critical 
dialogue on the issues that arise through our encounters with the grim and often 
disturbing realities of those for whom abject suffering is a part of everyday reality. It is 
much for the same reasons that critical studies of the mass media have been conducted 
since, as a key purveyor of ideologies that work in the interests of capital, there is much 
opportunity for ideologies to circulate that misinform or at least work to keep westerners 
ignorant of the conditions that mass markets create that leave individuals in a state of 
suffering. It is evident, then, that both conceptions of public sociology and studies of 
social suffering seek not only to open up a space for debate about the relationship 
between the discipline and wider publics, but so too is it evident that both consider the 
role of sociology in conducting research that intervenes in areas in which it is clear that 
social change is needed. 
 Public sociology and research on social suffering possess common goals, but 
nonetheless I am biased towards the projects outlined in the literature on social suffering. 
The issue that I take with public sociology is that it seeks to create a public sphere in a 
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society that is often monstrously inequitable. It is therefore unclear as to how such a 
sphere could smoothly operate amongst individuals who possess vastly different amounts 
of both economic and cultural capital. Furthermore, if the sum of all sociological 
endeavours was constituted by the activity of a public sphere, then it is unclear as to how 
the science that we call sociology would not be reduced to the orchestration of a political 
arena, an activity which is in no way scientific, and does not yield useful information 
about society with utilitarian applications. At least for now,  a functioning public sphere 
seems grossly unrealizable, though my work here is done with the intention of 
contributing to the creation of such a situation. 
 
Facts,  Values and Understanding in Sociology 
 My primary intention in this essay is to contribute to the tradition that understands 
sociology as a force for the progressive reconstruction of society by constructing an 
outline for what I call “empathic sociology.” This intention is founded on the assumption 
that abject material suffering
2
 should be the initial focus of a progressive sociology, 
because it is a universal existential condition that all humans seek to avoid yet, 
paradoxically, all forms of capitalism produce and sustain. Furthermore, this kind of 
extreme suffering prevents individuals from having meaningful, productive lives, and 
leaves them politically paralyzed, unable even to marginally affect the conditions that 
reproduce their position. Sociology should therefore be concerned with the question of 
how it is that the varying structures of social formations produce and sustain the 
socioeconomic conditions that allow abject material suffering to exist. Since suffering is 
                                                 
2
 We define “abject material suffering” as any undesired physical, psychological or emotional states of an 
individual brought about by the inability to sufficiently acquire the basic means to life, including physical 
sustenance, clothing, shelter, required medical treatment, etc.  
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the object of empathy, I will argue that empathy is both a motivation and a method of 
understanding for sociological research. In addition, I will argue that sociological 
research that is based on empathy does not conduct research based on preconceived value 
judgements, but on the desire to alleviate the suffering of another based on a purely 
emotional phenomenon, the feeling for and/or the feeling with another. This will be 
argued against the background of Weber’s writings on the fact-value distinction and on 
Verstehen, as empathic sociology both borrows from and is critical of Weber’s views on 
these matters. My thesis can thus concisely be read as follows: The social-psychological 
phenomenon of empathy can be used as both the motivation and the method for a type of 
sociological research that seeks to make sociology truly scientific by granting it a 
practical purpose, that of uncovering the causes of abject material suffering with an aim 
to altering the conditions that engender those causes.     
The essay will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter will be concerned 
with providing a full explication of Weber’s discussion of the fact-value distinction, and 
of his method of Verstehen. Our exegesis of the fact-value distinction seeks to illustrate 
to the reader Weber’s notion of ‘value judgement’, and the way in which he uses this 
definition to both positively and negatively circumscribe the role of the sociologist. This 
will be followed by an exegesis of Verstehen to illustrate Weber’s conception of the role 
of empathy in sociological research. Both of these discussions together provide the 
critical foundations of our claims in chapter three. 
 In chapter two we will be concerned with constructing a coherent notion of 
empathy, as there currently exist many different definitions of this phenomenon in the 
existing academic literature. Using research from contemporary psychology combined 
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with notions from the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, we will outline the 
essential characteristics of empathy. Our logic in selecting phenomenology as our 
methodology is that, since it is a tradition that is often concerned with uncovering the 
essences of human phenomena conceptually, phenomenological notions are often 
complimentary to the phenomena of psychological research in that they are able to 
clearly express their fundamental features. It therefore provides us with the appropriate 
descriptive and conceptual tools in which to frame our thesis. 
In the third and final chapter, using the notion of empathy developed in chapter 
two, we will present our main arguments in defence of an empathic sociology. They will 
be framed as a response to Weber that uses the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s method of 
understanding as a guide for our own development of the foundations for an empathic 
sociology.  
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Chapter 1: The Fact/Value Distinction and Weber’s Moral Relativism 
Weber provides an account in his work of the fact-value distinction and its 
relation to sociological research. He also provides his own account of Verstehen. Both 
accounts stress the importance of the sociologist remaining separate from any kind of 
involvement in the real lives of the research subjects. This chapter will provide a brief 
history of both the fact-value distinction and Verstehen and European social thought, as 
well as a critical commentary on both in relation to my thesis. 
  The Fact/Value Distinction: A Brief History 
According to the philosopher Hilary Putnam (2002: 14), the history of what has 
come to be known as the fact-value distinction begins with the thought of the philosopher 
David Hume. The distinction was foreshadowed by what has come to be known as 
“Hume’s Law,” the claim that one cannot infer an “ought” from an “is,” an “it is” 
statement from an “it should be so” statement. Hume’s conclusion is a consequence of 
the epistemological distinction he makes between “matters of fact” and “relations of 
ideas.” For Hume, concepts are “ideas” that can only represent “matters of fact” via 
resemblance (including any of the senses, not simply sight). Ideas, however, can also 
involve “sentiments” (emotions), which Hume argued are the basis of all of our ethical 
claims, our claims about right and wrong action. Since emotions do not have observable 
properties that can be “pictured” in our minds, then they are merely owing to “the 
particular structure and fabric” of our minds, or put more simply, they constitute purely 
subjective experiences. The field of ethics as a philosophical area of inquiry is therefore 
never about “matters of fact.” This does not, however, preclude the possibility of ethical 
“wisdom.” This is because Hume shared what Putnam aptly calls “the comfortable 
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eighteenth-century assumption” that all well-educated and cultivated individuals who 
have thought carefully about ethical matters from an “impartial” standpoint would all end 
up sharing the same appropriate “sentiments” of approval and disapproval in the same 
circumstances, unless they possess some sort of intrinsic personal flaw that prevents them 
from doing so, whatever that might be. It goes without saying that Hume, like many of 
the pre-Enlightenment thinkers, invested his faith in a structurally homogeneous faculty 
of reason to bring him to sound moral conclusions in ethical deliberation. 
 Following Hume, the fact/value distinction became known as such during the first 
half of the twentieth century for the logical positivists, a group of philosophers who, 
among other ambitions that were never realized, attempted to transform the discipline of 
philosophy itself into the loyal vanguard of the natural sciences. As part of this ambition, 
the positivists took the fact-value distinction to a new extreme. They did so by reducing 
all putative judgements to three general types: analytic, synthetic (borrowing this 
distinction from Kant), and those that include all of our ethical, aesthetic, and 
metaphysical judgements, which were all considered to be “cognitively meaningless.” 
Analytic statements are those that are true by their very definition, or a priori (“true on 
the basis of the [logical] rules alone”). For example, “the bachelor is unmarried” is a 
token example of what the positivists classified as a “true analytic statement.” Synthetic 
statements are those that are empirically verifiable. As for cognitively meaningless 
statements, the positivists agreed that ethical statements cannot be factual not only 
because they are unverifiable (a statement with which Hume would have agreed), but also 
because they cannot be said to be true or false on the basis of the rules of the language in 
which they are stated. They therefore “do not possess a certain logical characteristic 
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common to all proper scientific statements” (i.e. verifiability), and are thus always 
already considered to be “logically invalid” by their very form and content. The 
positivists therefore generally agreed that the field of ethics should be expelled from the 
domain of science and philosophy altogether.  
 According to Putnam, the positivist definition of a fact became problematic 
almost as soon as it was argued in light of the scientific discoveries of the twentieth 
century. There are a number of examples that illustrate this. Bacteria, which are not 
observable in the logical positivist sense, but only by aid of microscope, were known to 
exist. The internal structure of the atom (electrons, protons, neutrons, positrons, mesons, 
etc.) was rapidly being discovered, not to mention relativity theory and quantum 
mechanics. The definition of a fact as merely a “sense impression” was becoming 
increasingly untenable. But the positivists were persistent. In his work entitled 
Foundations of Logic and Mathematics (1938), the philosopher Rudolf Carnap attempted 
to revise the positivists’ “criteria of significance” by abandoning the original 
requirements that a meaningful factual predicate must either be an observation predicate 
or “reduced to” observation predicates. He wrote that as long as a theoretical system “as a 
whole” enables us to predict our experiences more successfully than we could without 
them, then certain “abstract terms” can be accepted as “empirically meaningful.” It turned 
out that this posed a host of problems, and there are very few philosophers or scientists 
who now subscribe to the verificationist criteria of intelligibility of the kind that Carnap 
proposed.  
 
 
21 
 
 
 
Weber’s Disenchantment: Facts, Values and Moral Relativism in Sociology 
The place of the fact-value distinction as an issue in sociology has its own history, 
but the the most thorough and emphatic proclaimant of the distinction’s essential role in 
sociological research is still Max Weber. In his methodological essays entitled “The 
Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics” (1949a), and “ 
‘Objectivity’ in the Social Sciences’” (1949b), Weber emphasizes the importance of 
keeping what he calls “value judgements” out of sociological research. He defines value 
judgements as “practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory nature of 
phenomena subject to our influence,” and again as those evaluations “regarding the 
desirability or undesirability of social facts from ethical, cultural or other points of view” 
(1949a: 1). Weber’s definition therefore includes both practical judgements and 
judgements about social facts from different points of view. He articulates his position 
very clearly:  
 
What is really at issue is the intrinsically simple demand that the investigator…should 
keep unconditionally separate the establishment of empirical facts (including the “value-
oriented” conduct of the empirical individual whom he is investigating) and his [sic.] own 
practical evaluations, i.e., his evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory…These two things are logically different and to deal with them as though 
they were the same represents a confusion of entirely heterogeneous problems
3
 (11).  
 
It is quite clear that the Humean fact-value distinction is embedded in this 
methodological statement. Weber is essentially arguing that the sociologist should avoid 
                                                 
3
 By “problems,” Weber means, for example, the difference between the question “why do the concrete 
events in question occur thus and so and not otherwise?”, versus “from which standpoints may those 
situations be satisfactory or unsatisfactory?” 
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making value judgements of any kind in relation to the social phenomenon under study. 
This is because, for Weber, empirical judgements and  value judgements represent two 
different types of judgement -  empirical judgements describe the social world as it is 
observed, whereas value judgements pinpoint those aspects of the social world that are 
perceived by the individual to be “desirable or undesirable.” Weber further asserts that 
“any attempt to treat these logically different types of proposition as identical only 
reduces the value of each of them.” It is clear then that, for Weber, the fact-value 
distinction helps characterize the conduct of research that is foundational to the 
sociologist; the distinction becomes a maxim, a fundamental imperative (one that is itself 
a value judgement by Weber’s own definition) shared by social scientists that prevents 
the researcher from being led astray from the path to “acceptable” scientific data. Weber 
thus exorcizes the contemplation of the pragmatic “use-value” from the mind of the 
inquirer, as if this kind of contemplation used as a guide to research could only lead him 
to a life of epistemic condemnation, rendering his data “impure.” It does not occur to 
Weber that this exorcism might leave the researcher lost, gathering information without 
purpose and with no application.    
In addition to his discussion of the importance of the fact-value distinction to the 
researcher, Weber provides arguments against a “science of ethics,” an idea prevalent in 
Weber’s time which suggested that the application of the scientific method to human 
conduct could uncover “objective” moral laws, universal precepts that could be tested in 
order to determine whether or not the actions they prescribed yielded desirable results. 
Weber explicitly states that he is “most emphatically opposed to the view that a realistic 
‘science of ethics,’ i.e., the analysis of the influence which the ethical evaluations of a 
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group of people have on their other conditions of life and of the influences which the 
latter, in their turn, exert on the former, can produce an ‘ethics’ which will be able to say 
anything about what should happen” (1949a: 13). Weber later elaborates this position: 
 
[T]he scientific treatment of value-judgements may not only understand and empathically 
analyze (nacherleben) the desired ends and the ideals which underlie them; it can only 
“judge” them critically. This criticism…can be no more than a formal logical judgement 
of historically given value-judgements and ideas, a testing of the ideals according to the 
postulate of the internal consistency of the desired end. It can…aid the acting willing 
person in attaining self-clarification concerning the final axioms from which his desired 
ends are derived. It can assist him in becoming aware of the ultimate standards of value 
which he does not make explicit to himself or, which he must presuppose in order to be 
logical. The elevation of these ultimate standards, which are manifested in concrete 
value-judgements, to the level of explicitness is the utmost that the scientific treatment of 
value-judgements can do without entering into the realm of speculation. As to whether 
the person expressing these value-judgements should adhere to these ultimate standards is 
his personal affair; it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge. An 
empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do – but rather what he can do – and 
under certain circumstances – what he wishes to do (54). 
 
In other words, a “science of ethics” is only capable of revealing the “desired ends” that 
compel us to make the value judgements that we do. Once these desired ends are 
elucidated, we can then isolate and clarify the precepts from which these ends were 
derived, and evaluate their internal consistency and logical coherence. Beyond this, 
Weber argues, there is nothing else that a science of ethics can provide for us; it is 
incapable of telling us which axioms we should choose in order to guide our actions. 
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After articulating this position, Weber attempts to provide consolation to the 
reader by claiming that a method of empirical observation that only yields an 
“understanding explanation” (his term for the kind of understanding used to comprehend 
ethical systems) is not something regrettable. For one thing, he says, we can only discern 
“the really decisive motives of human actions” by leaving out our own value judgements, 
since otherwise these motives would be distorted and therefore yield a misinformed 
understanding of the phenomena under observation. In addition, a politically neutral 
approach to research allows the inquirer to understand “really divergent evaluations” 
from one’s own. For Weber, the emotional distance that is fundamental to this kind of 
approach enables researchers to fully understand what another person is thinking and 
feeling, and therefore enables them to clearly take up a position toward what the other is 
saying. This further allows one to isolate “unbridgeably divergent ultimate evaluations.” 
Weber stresses that this does not necessarily entail a passive attitude toward these values, 
but can lead to an “awareness of the issues and reasons which prevent agreement,” an 
awareness that cannot itself engender the formulation of normative principles. Weber 
therefore stresses that all an empirical discipline can demonstrate are the means to, and 
the competition of specific evaluations – as well as their anticipated consequences - 
within a particular context. He further adds that what we choose to value in certain 
contexts of action are entirely matters of “choice and compromise,” and cannot provide 
us with unequivocal conclusions as to which precepts should ultimately guide our 
conduct: “The social sciences, which are strictly empirical sciences, are the least fitted to 
presume to save the individual the difficulty of making a choice, and they should 
therefore not create the impression that they can do so.”  
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It is also important for us to consider here a famous passage from “ ‘Objectivity’ 
in the Social Sciences,” which Weber begins by reiterating the same discussion that was 
articulated in the previous essay:  
 
It is simply naïve to believe…that it is possible to establish and to demonstrate as 
scientifically valid a ‘principle’ for practical social science from which the norms for the 
solution of practical problems can be unambiguously derived. However much the social 
sciences need the discussion of practical problems in terms of fundamental principles, 
i.e., the reduction of unreflective value-judgements to the premises from which they are 
logically derived…the creation of a lowest common denominator for our problems in the 
form of generally valid ultimate value-judgements cannot be its task or in general the task 
of any empirical science. Such a thing would not only be impracticable; it would be 
entirely meaningless as well…The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of 
knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the 
results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this 
meaning itself. It must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be 
the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move 
us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just 
as sacred to others as ours are to us (1949b: 56-57). 
 
Weber’s notion of disenchantment, one that pervades much of his work, is implicated in 
this passage. Using a biblical reference to the “tree of knowledge” in the Garden of Eden, 
Weber likens the discovery of empirical knowledge to a kind of “Fall from Grace,” a sort 
of loss of innocence whereby, in uncovering the impersonal, morally indifferent 
mechanics of a godless, Galilean universe, one at the same time strips the anthropocentric 
cosmos of the meaning it formerly possessed. This theme of disenchantment is a well-
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known one in Weber’s work, and this passage undoubtedly conjures a nostalgia for an 
idealized pre-industrial Europe in which the meaning of life was still inscribed in a sacred 
universe that had not yet been emptied of personal direction and purpose by the 
rationalization of a bureaucratically centralized social order. Weber uncovers the 
unbridgeable disjuncture between empirical analysis and normative prescription, and 
paves the way for a moral relativism that is grounded in nothing but the anchors of 
cultural transmission, leaving it anyone’s guess as to where humanity’s collective moral 
compass should be directed.   
Although there is much that we could say at this point about the epistemological 
assumptions that underlie Weber’s work, it would be most beneficial for us here to 
explicate the ethical position that is realized in his methodological writings – provided 
that we are specifically discussing value judgements made from an ethical standpoint. On 
the one hand, Weber articulates an ontological position in which values are essentially 
culturally transmitted beliefs that motivate individual actions. This in turn leads to the 
epistemological assertion that value judgements can be isolated, circumscribed and 
clarified like any other social data, and can therefore constitute facts in and of 
themselves. On the other hand, although moral beliefs might be “real” in and of 
themselves, i.e., they are really believed by particular individuals, the “rightness” or 
“wrongness” of the actions to which the beliefs refer cannot be empirically verified. This 
is because, for Weber, beliefs about right and wrong are culturally arbitrary 
constructions, and therefore cannot be anchored in the material, observable, “objective” 
world. This is why Weber so adamantly defends the claim that science can do nothing to 
uncover “objective” moral beliefs; if an individual consults the observable world in order 
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to uncover what is right and wrong, this world will only reciprocate silence: “[T]o judge 
the validity of…values is a matter of faith” (55). It can therefore justifiably be said that 
Weber himself admits to being a moral relativist. In this sense moral beliefs are relative 
to cultural conditioning and do not have any absolute basis outside of this conditioning. 
We initiate certain actions because they reflect how it is that we were taught to behave, 
but there exists no absolute source of justification that can tell us without a doubt which 
actions are right and which are wrong – we only designate actions as right or wrong 
because we are made to believe that they are one or the other through cultural 
transmission. For Weber, God is effectively dead – the disenchanted universe leaves it to 
us to decide how we should and should not act, how we should treat one other. As for 
what to do about this, Weber, provides us with no answer. He simply makes it clear that 
the social scientist cannot address the matter of values because the signs of rightness and 
wrongness are no longer inscribed in the world. 
 
Weber and ‘Verstehen’ 
Verstehen, or “understanding,” has a long history that, at least for our purposes 
here, begins with the social theorist Wilhelm Dilthey and the distinction between 
Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften, the natural sciences and the human 
sciences. According to William Outhwaite, Dilthey distinguished the two not by their 
mode of operation but by their content: “In contrast to the natural sciences there arise the 
human sciences because we are obliged to endow human and animal organisms with 
mental activity” (Dilthey quoted in Outhwaite 1986: 25). According to Outhwaite, 
Dilthey’s work has commonly been considered to have been done in two periods that 
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each takes a different approach to hermeneutics, an earlier “individualistic and 
psychologistic” period, and a later period defined by a distinctly Hegelian method (26). 
We will focus here on the earlier approach, as this is mainly what informs Weber’s own 
notion of understanding. 
 The emphasis of Dilthey’s earlier psychologistic approach to the human sciences 
was on the empathetic penetration or reconstruction of other people’s mental processes. 
Dilthey argues that we have access to this psychological reality through the visible, 
bodily expressions of the other: “We call understanding that process whereby out of 
sensually given expressions of mental life the latter comes to be known.” It is this 
communicative and interpretive process that is central to the human sciences, what makes 
them unique from the natural sciences: “As in the natural sciences all law-like knowledge 
is only possible by means of what can be measured and counted in experiments and in the 
rules implied thereby, so in the Geisteswissenschaften every abstract proposition is 
verifiable only by means of its relation to active mental life as this is given in lived 
experience and understanding (Dilthey quoted in Outhwaite 1986: 27). Dilthey often 
likened this method to a “descriptive psychology.” For him it was not a matter of 
establishing causal regularities in people’s behaviour, but of reliving the “inner 
experience” of their thoughts and emotions. For Dilthey, we do this, at least in part, by 
transferring an analogue of our own experiences to other individuals. Dilthey wanted to 
believe that such a process was complimentary to causal explanation since it could be 
based on comparison and generalization, and could thus legitimately be considered a 
science proper. According to Outhwaite, however, Dilthey never came close to 
completing this methodology, and so his purported method of understanding never 
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became programmatic; it was never made clear as to what sort of “descriptive 
psychology” one was to actually pursue, what its epistemological standards and prescripts 
were to be (Outhwaite 1986: 26-29). 
 Heinrich Rickert, another major German thinker of the time who was to have a 
great influence on Weber was, like Dilthey, also concerned with the distinction between 
the natural and the human sciences. Unlike Dilthey’s interpretive approach, however, 
Rickert thought that what he called the “cultural sciences” (Kulturwissenschaften) 
“should conform to an existing epistemology and logic” (Outhwaite 1986: 38). The 
difference was that, unlike Dilthey, he thought the distinction was simply one of method 
rather than of content; what distinguished the latter from the former was that the cultural 
sciences were “individualizing” rather than generalizing, and involved meanings and 
“reference to values.” Rickert thus distinguishes “value-reference” from actual 
evaluation, where the former includes the role of the social scientist in outlining the 
moral significance of the phenomenon under study (we saw Weber make a similar 
distinction earlier in his discussion of facts and values). As Rickert himself says, “The 
science of history must…avoid making practical judgements on its objects and evaluating 
them as good or bad, but it can never lose from sight the relations of the objects to values 
in general, since it would then be unable to separate historically important from 
historically unimportant processes in empirical reality” (Rickert quoted in Outhwaite 
1986: 40). Rickert did not consider Verstehen to be an important concept, but he did 
regard Nacherleben, the imaginative “reliving” of the experiences of historical agents, as 
useful for “filling out” already formulated historical concepts. But overall, “reliving” 
such experiences for Rickert was simply impossible, since it is the meaning of an 
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individual’s action that we are able to understand, not their mental activity. This view is 
clearly outlined in a passage from Rickert’s Science and History (1899): 
 
The word ‘understanding’ is very ambiguous, and the concept that it denotes therefore 
requires precise definition. The crucial question in drawing the distinction between the 
cultural and the natural sciences is what the opposite of understanding is conceived to be. 
We must distinguish it from perceiving and in so doing conceive the latter idea so 
broadly that the entire world accessible to the senses…will be considered as the object of 
perception. But even then, in the interest of logical clarity we cannot rest content with the 
acts of the subject who does the understanding. On the contrary, from the methodological 
point of view it is the objects which are understood that are essential. If the entire world 
of phenomena directly accessible to the senses is designated as the object of perception, 
then only non-sensorial meanings or complexes of meaning remain as objects of 
understanding, if the world is to retain any precise signification (Rickert quoted in 
Outhwaite 1986: 41).         
 
What Rickert implies here is that meanings or “complexes of meaning” are inseparable 
from objects of perception, and therefore we cannot logically make a distinction between 
perception and understanding, as they are essentially both part of the same act. Since no 
objects are given to us except in perception, then we are left with nothing to understand 
except these objects, making the understanding of one’s inner experience impossible. It is 
therefore clear that Rickert does not follow the psychologistic notion of Verstehen in the 
work of Dilthey, since for him the notion can only remain dubious and therefore lacking 
utility as a methodological device.  
 In his preface to Economy and Society (1958), Weber gives due credit to both the 
sociologist and philosopher Georg Simmel  and Rickert, as well as the German 
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existentialist Karl Jaspers, for providing much of the substance of his own notion of 
Verstehen, which, as is well-known, is central to Weber’s outline of an interpretive 
sociology. As Weber asserts in the opening line of Economy, “Sociology…is a science 
concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a 
causal explanation of its course and consequences” (1958: 3). As understanding is thus 
the indispensable vehicle of interpretation, so is meaning the central object of 
sociological inquiry: “[F]or sociology in the present sense…the object of cognition is the 
subjective meaning-complex of action” (13). Or, as Weber later expresses it: 
“[S]ubjective understanding is the specific characteristic of sociological knowledge” (15). 
If sociology is concerned with the interpretive understanding of the meaning of social 
action, why then is it “subjective” for Weber? As Parsons explains in an endnote, 
“subjective” refers to “subjective states of mind and the meanings which can be imputed 
as intended by an actor…or of symbolic systems which are ultimately referable to such 
states of mind” (57). However, as Weber himself notes, meaning can also be attributable 
to a plurality of actors, and it can also refer “to the theoretically conceived pure type of 
subjective meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor or actors in a given situation” (4). 
In other words, meanings can also be attributed to group behaviour, and thus also as ideal 
types of meaning that are attributed to social actors in order to make sense of their 
behaviours. Therefore, sociology for Weber is essentially the interpretation of the 
meanings of social behaviours. 
 As noted above, Verstehen is the word that Weber uses to designate the active 
grasping or comprehension of the subjective meanings of the behaviours of social actors. 
Weber makes the claim that there exist two types of understanding, what he calls “direct 
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observational” and “explanatory” understanding respectively (1968: 8). Both of these 
types can further be classified either as “rational” or “emotionally empathic.” There is 
thus both a rational and “irrational” basis for understanding. For Weber, rational 
understanding deals with purposes, or teleological interpretations of social action, while 
the latter deals with the emotional expression of actors. Weber describes direct 
observational understanding as that by which we immediately grasp the practical 
meaning of another’s action(s). He does not, however, make it clear how the researcher is 
supposed to become empathic without forming any kind of emotional attachment with the 
research subject. He simply implies that the subject’s emotions can be interpreted clearly 
and directly, without any further consequences. He uses the example of a person who 
reaches for a knob to shut a door, or someone who points a gun at an animal. These are 
“rational” examples of direct observational understanding, since the reading of emotions 
are not involved in interpreting the actions. This kind of understanding is instead 
experienced “irrationally” when I experience the direct understanding of an emotional 
reaction such as “an outbreak of anger as manifested by facial expressions, exclamations 
or irrational movements” (5).  
 Weber’s second type of understanding - explanatory understanding - occurs when 
we understand the meaning of a social actor’s actions via her motives. This is only 
possible, Weber asserts, when we place the social actions in question in a more 
“intelligible and inclusive” context of meaning. In other words, we understand one’s 
motives through a broader comprehension of the situation in which one is situated. 
Again, such actions can be understood either rationally or irrationally. We might 
understand the chopping of wood or the aiming of a gun in a rational and motivational 
33 
 
 
 
sense if we know that the woodchopper is working for a wage or is chopping a supply of 
firewood for her own use or recreation, or that the individual aiming the gun has been 
commanded to shoot as a member of a firing squad or is fighting an enemy. On the other 
hand, we might understand “irrational” motives in these scenarios if we know that the 
woodchopper is working off a fit of rage, or if we know that the individual wielding the 
gun is aiming to shoot someone out of revenge (1968: 8-9). Therefore, in all of the above 
cases, “the particular act has been placed in a tangible sequence of motivation, the 
understanding of which can be treated as an explanation of the actual course of 
behaviour” (9).  
Weber’s account of Verstehen fails to account for the fact that feelings of 
affection or impulses to help would likely stem from the use of empathy in sociological 
research. It is Weber’s firm assertion that such phenomena must be excluded from 
scientific discourse in the name of a higher epistemic value judgement that postulates that 
such emotional “epiphenomena” will likely distort research results. Becoming the 
Weberian scientific subject, then, involves a kind of exclusion of certain phenomena of 
conscious empathic experience, a self-censoring, inwardly directed suppression of all 
emotions and impulses that, as we will argue later, has made empathy a socially useful 
phenomenon. The irony of this attempt to preserve the very scientificity of sociological 
research by Weber is that it leaves the researcher impotent in any practical sense, unable 
to anticipate the utility of his research, which is what gives scientific practice its prestige 
to begin with. For sociological research, empathy needs to be more than simply the 
interpretation of another’s emotions. It needs to also be able to understand social actors as 
products of the larger social frameworks in which they exist, and it needs to be able to 
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motivate practical action towards those in order for sociology to be able to possess any 
kind of practical facility. Empathy can be used for these purposes because it allows one to 
remain as objective as possible and still be able to clearly understand the operation of the 
social world and be of practical use to society. In order to explain this further we first 
need to construe an appropriate conception of empathy.   
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Chapter 2: Empathy  
In order to defend our  argument we first require a unified account of empathy. I 
have decided to use phenomenological concepts in the construction of this account 
because a) the philosophical tradition of phenomenology was, depending on the thinker, 
and for different purposes, often concerned with descriptive psychology, and b) occupied 
by the study of essences. The phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in the opening to 
his Phenomenology of Perception (2009[1945]) writes: “Phenomenology is the study of 
essences; and according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of essences: the 
essence of perception, or the essence of consciousness, for example.” Using the work of 
both the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, we are here concerned with 
outlining a kind of “essence” of empathy, a description of its most fundamental 
characteristics. In reality, this essence is of course tentative; like most concepts, it could 
potentially be elaborated or altered at any time with the presentation of new research. Our 
account will also be supported with contemporary research in psychology. This account 
will, however, provide us with a fundamental characterization of empathy by which we 
will be able to overcome the obstacle to meaningful research that was planted by Weber 
in the form of the fact-value distinction, and his notion of empathic understanding. 
 
Empathy: A Preliminary Working Definition 
 We could not very well proceed without having some basic idea of what empathy 
is. The problem is, there is no agreed upon definition among psychologists as to which 
phenomena actually constitute empathy. The psychologist C. Daniel Batson (2009) 
distinguishes eight different phenomena that have been called empathy by psychologists 
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in the past. These include: knowing another person’s internal state, adopting the posture 
of another, coming to feel as another feels, projecting oneself into another’s situation, 
imagining how another is thinking and feeling, imagining how one would think and feel 
in another’s place, feeling distress at witnessing another’s suffering, and feeling for 
another who is suffering. Our own notion of empathy will at least touch upon all of these 
definitions in one way or another, but here it is important to distinguish between two 
different meanings that one can extract from “Batson’s Eight”: feeling as another feels, a 
feeling with, and feeling distress at the sight of another’s suffering, or a feeling for. This 
distinction has often been referred to as the difference between empathy and sympathy 
(Wispé 1986; Gordon 1995). Since the existing research is far too preliminary at this 
point to be able to tell, with any degree of probability, which factors will evoke which 
phenomenon, we will follow Preston & de Waal (2002) and place both under the 
category of empathy. Our preliminary working definition is stated as follows: Empathy is 
a social relation whereby one comes to feel as another feels, or becomes distressed by the 
suffering of another. 
 
The Evolution of Empathy 
 To begin, we would like to put forward the claim that empathy is a product of our 
evolutionary history, which makes it innate and thus genetically-based. This presupposes 
that empathy is a “trait” that was selected at some point during the course of human 
evolution because it ultimately maximized individual/group reproductive success
4
. In an 
evolutionary context this is not an unreasonable claim. Goubert et al. (2009) have aptly 
                                                 
4
 As we will see shortly, we do not want to characterize empathy as a trait, but primarily as a relation. 
However, the latter term means nothing if there exist no things that can relate. Therefore, we will also refer 
to empathy as a “predisposition,” characterizing it as both a predisposition and a relation. 
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pointed out that empathy for the pain of others is an essential aspect of both personal and 
group survival, as it directs attention to the experiences of others when they confront 
physical danger and pain. In order to protect oneself or provide care for others, knowing 
others’ feelings, thoughts, and behavioural reactions in the context of what is happening 
to them may be crucial in deciding one’s course of action. Empathy thus facilitates 
appropriate responses to one’s environment such as, for example, ducking away from an 
attacker and responding to the cries of an infant
5
. Preston and de Waal (2002) have called 
such behaviours the “keystone” of reproductive success; they are evolutionarily 
advantageous because they allow individuals to spend more time on other activities that 
promote reproductive success, such as feeding and finding mates.  
Preston and de Waal have also theoretically situated empathy in an evolutionary 
context by asserting its necessity within the parent-child relationship, since this 
relationship is largely based on the ability of individuals to be affected by the emotional 
state of others; infants are emotionally affected by the state of their mothers, and mothers 
are emotionally affected by the state of their offspring. In the case of the infant, it is 
thought that the continuous and coordinated emotional and physical contact between the 
mother and infant influence the ability of the infant to regulate his emotions, which in 
turn determines the future emotional competence of the individual (Tronick 1989; 
Ungerer 1990; Field 1994; Jones et al. 1998). In the case of the parent, interactional 
views of development have suggested that the infant directs the mother’s behaviour as 
much as the mother directs the infant’s. For example, smiling and crying by the infant are 
thought to modify the affective and behavioural responses of their caregivers, since these 
                                                 
5
 The authors claim that the evolutionary importance of detecting and responding to danger is evident in the 
general design of the nervous system because response circuits dedicated to the perception of negative 
emotions, especially fear, have been much easier to locate in the brain relative to positive ones. 
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behaviours signal the infants’ internal states, which in turn provides the impetus for 
affection and action in others (Wiesenfeld & Klorman 1978). What all of this points to in 
the evolutionary sense is that emotional contagion often guides the parent-offspring 
relationship, increasing the “success” of both individuals; if a similar emotion is elicited 
in the parent as in the infant, then tailored care is much more likely. Proper care increases 
viability of the offspring and therefore also the reproductive success of the parent. 
Fulfilling the needs of the offspring also assuages the arousal of the caregiver and offsets 
the unwanted attention from group members and predators caused by an individual 
displaying distress (Preston & de Waal 2002). 
It is evident from these hypotheses that empathy has a place in evolutionary 
theory. This would implicate that empathy is an innate predisposition, a capacity that we 
are born with as part of our genetic heritage that allows us to have a particular type of 
relationship with others like us. Hence a new working definition is in order: Empathy is 
an innate predisposition that manifests itself as a social relation whereby one comes to 
feel as another feels, or becomes distressed by the suffering of another. This definition 
implies, in the most literal sense, that empathy is an embodied phenomenon, a biological 
predisposition that exists as part of the individual’s genetic architecture prior to any 
cultural conditioning.  
Since we are using contemporary social-psychological research as the starting 
point for our notion of empathy, one might think it appropriate to frame our notion using 
a symbolic interactionist framework using the thought of George Herbert Mead. In Mind, 
Self and Society (1934), Mead clearly spells out a notion of what he calls “sympathy” that 
corresponds with what many today would think of as empathy:  
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Sympathy comes…in the arousing in one’s self of the attitude of the individual whom 
one is assisting, the taking the attitude of the other when one is assisting the other…[I]n 
an attitude which is sympathetic we imply that our attitude calls out in ourselves the 
attitude of the person we are assisting. We feel with him and we are able so to feel 
ourselves into the other because we have, by our own attitude, aroused in ourselves of the 
person whom we are assisting (299). 
 
Mead’s account of sympathy contains many of the elements that will constitute our 
account of empathy; when one experiences it as a feeling with the other, one will often 
emotionally and/or cognitively adopt the perspective of the other. My justification for 
using a phenomenologically based account is that we want to understand empathy as an 
embodied phenomenon since suffering is its primary object, and we understand suffering 
to be a primarily physical phenomenon since, even though it has important emotional and 
cognitive dimensions, its object in our case are the physical, emotional, and 
psychological conditions brought about by material deprivations such as the inability to 
acquire proper bodily sustenance, clothing and shelter. Furthermore, phenomenology 
stems from a much older philosophical tradition that is better equipped to grasp the 
essence of phenomena generally. Since Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology allows us to 
grasp these elements in his conceptual framework, we will use a phenomenological 
account of empathy as opposed to a symbolic interactionist one. 
 
The Social World: Phenomenological Foundations 
 For Merleau-Ponty, the natural world and the social world are two different 
“dimensions” of the same world (2009 [1945]: 421). This world is primordial – it is 
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immediately and intuitively present to me at all times through the senses. Therefore, as 
the social world is constituted by the existence of myself and the primordial presence of 
others, then their existence is irrefutable. As the philosopher Mary Rose Barral has put it, 
“It is indeed Merleau-Ponty’s method to present the fruit of his investigation and 
reflections without attempting to prove anything. He sees the “de facto” intersubjective 
relations which exist among men…and describes these relations as they occur before 
him” (1984: 216). This notion of the primordial presence of the other is an aspect that 
runs throughout all of Merleau-Ponty’s work. He often has the tendency to make the 
claim that the other “just is,” that he exists for himself in the same way that I am a 
consciousness for myself, without needing to demonstrate or “prove” that he exists. For 
example, in “The Philosopher and His Shadow” (1964) he writes the following: “I know 
unquestionably that that man over there sees, that my sensible world is also his, because I 
am present at his seeing, it is visible in his eyes’ grasp of the scene.” He then depicts this 
“gleam” in the other’s eye as a kind of sign of the certainty of his existence: “Suddenly a 
gleam appeared a little bit below and out in front of its eyes; its glance is raised and 
comes to fasten on the very things that I am seeing…I say that there is a man there and 
not a mannequin, as I see that the table is there and not a perspective or an appearance of 
the table” (1964: 169). This description resurfaces in The Visible and the Invisible (1968):  
 
[S]uddenly there breaks forth the evidence that yonder also, minute by minute, life is 
being lived: somewhere behind those eyes, behind those gestures, or rather before them, 
or again about them, coming from I know not what double ground of space, another 
private world shows through, through the fabric of my own, and for a moment I live in it; 
I am no more than the respondent for the interpellation that is made to me. To be sure, the 
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least recovery of attention persuades me that this other who invades me is made only of 
my own substance… (1968: 10). 
 
So if for Merleau-Ponty the other is always already incontrovertibly given to me 
in existence, what are the conditions of possibility of our existence? For Merleau-Ponty 
there are a number of basic conditions of human social life. Perhaps the most 
fundamental is what he calls intercorporeity. This is the term that Merleau-Ponty uses to 
connote the brute sensibility of the world that we all share, a universal foundation of 
human existence as social beings: “My two hands ‘coexist’ or are ‘compresent’ because 
they are one single body’s hands. The other person appears through an extension of that 
compresence; he and I are like organs of one single intercorporeality…What I perceive to 
begin with is a different ‘sensibility’ (Empfindbarkeit), and only subsequently a different 
man and a different thought” (1964b: 168). Merleau-Ponty tries to describe 
intercorporeality at some length:  
 
The fact is that sensible being, which is announced to me in my most strictly private life, 
summons up within that life all other corporeality. It is the being which reaches me in my 
most secret parts, but which I also reach in its brute or untamed state, in an absolute of 
presence which holds the secret of the world, others, and what is true (171).  
 
 This dimension of being is arguably even more primordial than that which can be 
circumscribed as “the social,” since it is the fundamental condition of possibility of the 
social: “If the other person is to exist for me, he must do so to begin with in an order 
beneath the order of thought. On this level, his existence for me is possible…” (170). 
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Therefore, for Merleau-Ponty, even more fundamental than the dimension of the social is 
sensibility itself, the primary stratum of existence that constitutes us as social beings. 
In addition to the basic physical world of which we are both inextricably a part, 
we also share, and recognize that we share, an analogous structure. This denotes the fact 
that the body of the other appears to me as having a structure like my own, and therefore 
is a form of behaviour like myself. Even though I cannot experience the other’s 
consciousness in the way that I experience my own, to a certain extent his consciousness 
is expressed “on the outside” by his body. Because I can express my own consciousness 
in a similar fashion – that is, because I am “in” a body that is able to express meaning 
through language and gesture - there exists a direct and immediate relationship between 
us in which we can communicate by interpreting one another’s words and gestures. This 
relationship presupposed that we each have a body schema, a “knowledge” that each of 
us intrinsically possesses of how to move our bodies in different ways without a 
conscious, step-by-step direction, as well as the bodily attunement that we have to our 
physical surroundings. For Merleau-Ponty we essentially are our bodies; they contain a 
proprioceptivity and tactility that we largely do not facilitate at the level of conscious 
representation: “Our bodily experience of movement is not a particular case of 
knowledge; it provides us with a way of access to the world and the object…which has to 
be recognized as original and perhaps as primary. My body has its world, or understands 
its world, without having to make use of my ‘symbolic’ or objectifying function’” (2009 
[1945]: 162). The body schema is thus an “immediately given invariant whereby the 
different motor tasks are instantaneously transferable.” It is the body schema coupled 
with our sensory apparatus that essentially makes us “bodies-in-the-world,” so many 
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“open systems” that are correlative with the world, not analytically separated and distinct 
from it.  
Let us here briefly review the concepts that Merleau-Ponty puts forward as the 
foundations of the social world. The fact of other beings like us who exist in the world is 
primordial, meaning that it is always already immediately given. This is made possible in 
part through intercorporeity, the fundamental physical plane of existence by which we 
are all constituted. We are recognizable to each other since our bodies are analogous 
structures, each possessing a body schema that allows us to navigate the immediate 
perceptible world. As we will see shortly, these are the foundations of mimicry, which is 
in turn foundational to our notion of embodied empathy. 
 
Mimicry  
 As we so often fancy ourselves to be autonomous beings, we often find it difficult 
to fathom that we were, at the very beginning of our lives, entirely co-dependent. What 
allows us to survive is the fact that at birth, just as we become physically attuned to our 
environments, so too do we become attuned to the others like us who exist within those 
environments. We are fundamentally social creatures before we can call ourselves 
independent, a fact that Merleau-Ponty recognized: “Our relationship to the social is, like 
our relationship to the world, deeper than any express perception or any judgement,” that 
“which we carry about inseparably with us before any objectification” (2009 [1945]: 
421). But what conditions allow us to be fundamentally social? It would appear that, 
starting from birth, our bodies are “open” to one another in the sense that any bodily 
phenomena whatsoever can act as a means of communication to another body. The 
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totality of this phenomenon is manifested through mimicry, the capacity to reflect 
another’s movements in one’s own that each of us possesses, a phenomenon that 
necessarily signals the fully communicable correspondence of individual body schemas, 
the recognition of one another’s shared and fully transposable locomotive self-
samenesses that can each be instantaneously summoned and manipulated for the other. 
Merleau-Ponty provides a descriptive passage of this phenomenon reflected in a young 
infant: 
 
A baby of fifteen months opens its mouth if I playfully take one of its fingers between my 
teeth and pretend to bite it…The fact is that its own mouth and teeth, as it feels them 
from the inside, are immediately, for it, an apparatus to bite with, and my jaw, as the baby 
sees it from the outside, is immediately, for it, capapble of the same intentions. ‘Biting’ 
has immediately, for it, an intersubjective significance. It perceives its intentions in its 
body, and my body with its own, and thereby my intentions in its own body (2009 
[1945]: 410). 
            
Although the infant that Merleau-Ponty describes is fifteen months old, more 
recent research would suggest that the ability of humans to mimic one another might be 
innate. In 1977, the psychologist Andrew Meltzoff had a study published entitled 
‘Imitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human Neonates’. In the study, six infants 
between twelve and twenty-one days old were each shown a number of facial and hand 
gestures in sequence. Each infant was videotaped, and each tape was shown to an 
observer who had to guess which expression the infant was emulating. The results 
showed that in most cases the observer guessed the expression that the experimenter was 
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trying to make the infant mimick, suggesting that the infant was in fact mimicking the 
gestures correctly. Meltzoff considered his study to be significant in that it suggested that 
mimicry was an innate mechanism, whereas previous studies such as those by the 
psychologist Jean Piaget suggested that newborn infants lacked the perceptual-cognitive 
sophistication required for such actions, and could only develop these capacities after 
roughly eight to twelve months.  
 If the human potential to mimic is innate, this would presuppose the claim that 
infants have the ability to recognize other people, regardless of age, as analogous 
structures, a recognition that improves with age, as evinced by the fact that behaviours 
that we observed in others growing up are internalized by us as they are learned over 
time. The most important implication of mimicry for us to consider here is that our bodies 
are always already attuned to each other; they can communicate with one another through 
their mutual recognition. When I perceive the gestures of another, I am capable of 
instantaneously either replicating those gestures, or I can respond to them with reciprocal 
gestures. This is not something that I do with any conscious effort; as if attached by 
invisible strings, the parts of another’s body correspond with the same parts of my own, 
their possibilities for movement correspond with my possibilities, because each of our 
bodies already recognizes itself in the other. Although I do not necessarily see my own 
movement, I already “know” how the structures of our bodies correspond. This bodily 
correspondence that Merleau-Ponty conceptualizes is, as we will see shortly, is the 
primary condition of possibility for empathy.   
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Embodied Empathy: Emotional Contagion Vs. the Perception-Action Model 
 If there exists the primordial recognition of one’s own body in another’s, the 
question then arises as to how one could come to enter into the relation of empathy with 
another. There are two competing answers to this question that currently exist. One is the 
theory of emotional contagion put forth by the psychologist Elaine Hatfield and her 
colleagues, while the other is the perception-action model of empathy put forth by the 
psychologist Stephanie Preston and the primatologist Frans de Waal. We will here 
provide an account of these theories as they have been developed in recent literature.  
Hatfield and her colleagues (1994; 2009) have put forth the hypothesis that people 
possess the ability to “feel themselves into” another’s emotions, resulting in a kind of 
emotional “sharing,” or contagion. Although emotional contagion is a complex process 
that entails many different neurological and psychological phenomena, a description of it 
can be broken down into three essential propositions or stages. The first stage is mimicry, 
the ability that people have to automatically and continuously synchronize their 
movements with the facial expressions, voices, postures, movements, and instrumental 
behaviours of others. The second stage is “feedback,” in which people’s emotional 
experience is affected, moment to moment, by the activation of and/or feedback from 
facial, vocal, postural, and movement mimicry
6
. Hatfield claims that, theoretically 
speaking, emotional experience can be influenced by the central nervous system that 
commands mimicry, the afferent feedback from such facial, verbal, or postural mimicry, 
or conscious self-perception processes, wherein individuals make inferences about their 
                                                 
6
 The philosopher Robert Gordon has echoed this idea with his notion of ‘facial empathy’: “It is known that 
motor activity, especially the movement of facial muscles, can drive the emotions. Even when we 
voluntarily contract specific facial muscles or produce vowel sounds that force the contraction of these 
muscles, we tend to bring on the emotion that characteristically produces a corresponding facial 
expression” (1995: 729). 
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own emotional states on the basis of their own expressive behaviour. The third stage is 
contagion. Hatfield claims that, as a consequence of mimicry and feedback, people tend, 
from moment to moment, to “catch” the emotions of others. Hatfield’s theory of 
emotional contagion has of course not gone unchallenged, however two studies that were 
meant to test Hatfield’s hypothesis both found that there existed much evidence to 
support it (see Wild et al. 2001; 2003).  
Preston and de Waal are skeptical of the emotional contagion theory because it is 
not evolutionarily beneficial for an individual to have to go through the process of 
mimicking an individual every time that we witness her expressing emotion; this would 
certainly be a far less efficient form of empathy. This is not to say that we do not 
automatically mimic to a certain extent in specific situations. But one would think that 
there would exist a more efficient way to, at other times, experience emotions similar to 
those of others. The model of empathy that Preston and de Waal put forth is referred to as 
the perception-action model, or the PAM (2002). The key difference between their model 
and Hatfield’s theory is that, rather than focussing on mimicked motor activity, the 
authors focus on mimicked neural representations. They define empathy as “any process 
where the attended perception of the object’s state generates a state in the subject that is 
more applicable to the object’s state or situation than to the subject’s own prior state or 
situation” (2002: 4) PAM is a “process model” since empathy is a “superordinate” 
category that includes “all subclasses of phenomena that share the same mechanism,” and 
are therefore not entirely separable. For the authors this means that all forms of empathy 
involve some level of emotional contagion and personal distress, and help is never 
entirely for the sake of the object. The PAM of empathy specifically states that “attended 
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perception of the object’s state automatically activates the subject’s representations of the 
state, situation, and object, and that activations of these representations automatically 
primes or generates the associated autonomic (motor) and somatic (emotional) 
responses.” Therefore, according to this model, perceptions of others’ emotional 
expressions in different situations automatically leads one to match the other’s emotional 
state because perception and action rely on some of the same neural circuitry. As a result 
of the matched neural representations, which do not need to produce matched motor 
activity, one comes to feel some of what the other feels, and therefore understands the 
other’s internal state. 
We thus have two different accounts of embodied empathy. Hatfield’s theory of 
emotional contagion suggests empathy is felt for another through the mimicry of their 
bodily expressions, whereas Preston and de Waal suggest that it is felt simply through the 
perception of the other’s bodily state. The difference is not, however, a matter of major 
importance for us here. What concerns us is how empathy takes place, how it is that we 
can come to feel what another feels, or how we can come to feel distress at the sight of 
one who is suffering. We found that the other is primordially given to us in the world as 
one who is “like me” in the sense that his body is constituted by a general structure that is 
analogous to my own in that it possesses the same essential components. The result of 
this is that our bodies are synchronous – we can both emulate each other and reciprocate 
one another, as if I was mirrored in the other. This is possible because we each have the 
ability locate the movements of another on our own bodies instantaneously via 
perception. What this ultimately means is that the emotional states that we associate with 
bodily gestures, movements and expressions are one with those expressions; there is no 
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emotion/body dualism. Anything that we feel has a physical manifestation. Therefore, if I 
can perceive another and mimic that other, or at the very least “read” the other’s “body 
language,” it follows that in doing so I can “re-experience” that other’s emotions of 
which their facial expressions and gestures are the manifestation. Our analogous body 
structures, because they correspond to one another in all of their parts, and because they 
are subject to the same corporeal conditions, can therefore convey to one another the 
expressions that shape them – if I contort my face in a grimace of pain, the pain is 
experienced by you as a behaviour with a meaning rather than as a sensation. You 
identify it as essentially as an expression of the body, an expression that you can in turn 
identify and mimic. Empathy is thus an embodied phenomenon; I feel your emotion 
either because I can mimic the expression that that emotion essentially is, or I can feel 
distress because I understand the meaning that your expression conveys.  
 
Cognitive Empathy 
 So far we have looked at empathy as an intercorporeal phenomenon whereby 
bodies are inextricably bound to one another, and can thus construct a sense of one 
another’s “inner” lives through perception and mimicry. But as many of us can infer 
simply from daily living, it is not simply by way of the body that we come to interpret 
and re-experience the thoughts and feelings of the other, or express sympathy for her. 
Another way we do this is by means of the imagination. The type of empathy that utilizes 
the imagination as a medium of understanding is often referred to as cognitive empathy or 
“perspective-taking.” Unfortunately there exists no recent research that attempts to 
conceptualize the dynamics of cognitive empathy (see for example Batson 2009). In 
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order to do this, then, we will use phenomenological tools to conceptualize not only the 
essential character of the imagination itself, but also of cognitive empathy. Let us then 
provide a brief summary of the imagination from a phenomenological standpoint. 
 
The Imaginary 
Jean-Paul Sartre, in a work entitled The Imaginary: A Phenomenological 
Psychology of the Imagination (2004 [1940]) presented a theory of the imagination that 
was influenced by the philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano. The latter defined 
imagination as such: “Phantasy presentations are nonintuitional or inauthentic 
presentations which approximate to intuitional presentations…The border is admittedly 
blurred” (Brentano, quoted in Bernet et al. 1993). Thus Brentano sets up the distinction 
between the “inauthentic” simulacra that appear before us in our minds versus the 
“authentic” perceptions of objects in the material world that appear before us through the 
senses. This essential distinction, as we shall see, underlies Sartre’s characteriztion of the 
imagination. 
 In his phenomenological analysis, Sartre presents four characteristics of the 
imagination that he believes constitute its essence: the image as a consciousness, quasi-
observation, the image as a nothingness, and spontaneity. The “image as a 
consciousness” is Sartre’s contention that the act of imagining an object is an actual 
consciousness of that object, although of a different kind than the consciousness of an 
object that we perceive in front of us in the world. “Quasi-observation” denotes the fact 
that, although we are “observing” an object “in our minds,” this is clearly an observation 
of a different type. The difference for Sartre is that, when we perceive an object in the 
51 
 
 
 
world, the richness of that perception “overflows” us, meaning that we can constantly 
scrutinize objects so as to discover more and more about them. In the imagination, 
however, there is always a certain poverty to the object; we can only present to ourselves 
what we already know about it; it does not reveal to us any novel characteristics, but 
simply those that we have stored in memory. Third, there is the image as a “nothingness,” 
which  simply denotes the fact that there is a fundamental unreality to anything that I 
imagine; if I posit a table in my mind, the table is of course not really sensorily present to 
me, but merely a representation in my mind. Finally, there is spontaneity, which denotes 
the fact that, whereas perceptual consciousness is passive, “an imaging consciousness 
gives itself to itself as an imaging consciousness…a spontaneity that produces and 
conserves the object as imaged.” It “appears to itself as creative, but without positing as 
object this creative character.” In other words, unlike things in the perceived external 
world, I can present whatever objects I want whenever I want to myself in my 
imagination. We will see shortly how Sartre’s fundamental characteristics of the 
imagination act as the basis for our characterization of cognitive empathy.  
 
First-Person/Third-Person: The Essence of Cognitive Empathy 
 In his work entitled The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1776), the eighteenth-
century economist Adam Smith made this point regarding empathy: “Though our brother 
is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us 
of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it 
is by the imagination only that we can inform of any conception of what are his 
sensations” (1976 [1776]: 9). Although we are in agreement with this basic point, we 
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would here like to add that the imagination formulates such a conception either from a 
first-person or a third-person standpoint – either we imagine a scenario as it plays out 
before us, or we imagine it as if we ourselves were the “protagonists” of the scenario. In 
order to provide a full account of the character of cognitive empathy, let us here 
“imagine” two scenarios to highlight what we will postulate as the essential 
characteristics of cognitive empathy. 
One evening you receive a phone call. It is a close friend of yours who tells you 
that her mother has just passed away. She is crying softly. As stated above, we can 
imagine this event from a first-person or from a third-person perspective. If you imagine 
it from a first-person perspective you feel saddened, because your own mother is still 
alive and in good health and, since you are fairly close to her, you know that you would 
be deeply shaken by her loss. If you then attribute that feeling of sadness to your friend, 
and imagine it to be of a far greater magnitude than what you felt simply from imagining 
your own mother’s death (because her mother has just died in reality), then you 
immediately begin to feel sad for your friend. You can also experience sadness for your 
friend if you imagine her situation from a third-person perspective – you picture her 
sitting in her house, shoulders slumped and hair dishevelled as she cries into the phone. 
As she describes how she found out about her mother’s death you can imagine what she 
describes to you. Now, it is clear that all of Sartre’s fundamental characteristics of the 
imagination apply to this scenario, regardless of which perspective one takes. In the first-
person scenario in which you imagine your own mother dying, the scenario plays out in 
your mind in the same way that you would watch a film, as an “image-consciousness.” 
The scenario is “quasi-observed” since it does not possess a richness of perception that 
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transcends you, but only contains what you give it. It is a “nothingness” in the sense that 
you are aware that what you quasi-observe in your mind is not a real situation happening 
right in front of you; it is composed of images in your mind. Finally, there is a certain 
“spontaneity” to your perspective – you can imagine your mother’s funeral in different 
ways, and you can imagine your friend sitting in her kitchen or in her living room. In 
short, you are in control of the way in which you imagine the scenario.  
In addition to Sartre’s characteristics of the imagination, we would here like to 
present two characteristics that we believe to be fundamental to cognitive empathy. One 
is that your perspective is not only quasi-observed, but also quasi-real - although the 
scenario that you imagine is not a real event in and of itself, it is used to simulate a real 
event and the real emotional experiences of the individual who is experiencing the actual 
event. This leads us to our second point, which is that the events that you simulate in your 
mind are interpretive in nature; since one cannot directly experience another’s emotions 
except through embodied empathy, one can attempt to understand what one might feel by 
simulating his emotions. Therefore, in essence, cognitive empathy is both quasi-real in 
the sense that it aims to simulate a real event using an imaginative one of one’s own 
making, and interpretive in the sense that it is an attempt to understand the emotional 
experiences of another.   
This brings us to our second scenario. A friend of yours recently fell off her roof 
and dislocated her shoulder while painting an upper section of her house, and was 
immediately taken to a hospital. Though you were not there to witness the accident 
yourself, after she tells you about it, it is not difficult to imagine. We need not here go 
through all of the essential aspects of the imagination that we used in the previous 
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example. The reason that we here want to use this second example is to highlight the fact 
that imagined situations can also be interpreted using the body schema, which implies 
that both embodied and cognitive empathy are fundamentally intertwined. This is 
because, regardless of whether or not I imagine my friend falling off her roof from a first-
person or a third-person perspective, I can still “feel” her dislocate her shoulder, even if I 
do not actually know what it feels like from first-hand experience to dislocate my 
shoulder. However, my body schema allows me to simulate this process by giving me a 
sensation in my shoulder. This is not to say that this sensation will even come close to 
resembling the pain that my friend experiences, but it allows me to interpret and thus 
understand what she went through so that I will respond to her by showing compassion 
for her situation.  
We will here summarize what has been said in order to provide a final and clear 
account of what we understand by the notion of cognitive empathy. The latter is a process 
by which I attempt to interpret and thus understand the situation of another by simulating 
his experience using my imaginative capacity from either a first-person or a third-person 
perspective. Rather than mimicking or actually perceiving an individual in emotional 
distress or pain, I simulate the situation that the other is in by imagining it based on an 
account of the situation that is given to me verbally. What is imagined is always both 
interpretive and quasi-real. It is interpretive because, by simulating the experience for 
myself, I attempt to understand what it would have felt like to be in a certain situation, or 
why it would have felt a certain way. Since I cannot immediately perceive the situation, 
all that I can try to do in order to obtain a grasp of the other’s internal state is imagine 
either what the situation is like or what it would have been like to have been in that 
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situation. It is quasi-real because, although I know that what takes place “in my mind’s 
eye” is not real itself, it is a simulation, a crude copy of a real situation that I create in 
order to try to obtain an understanding of another individual’s experience. We also saw 
that the body schema is somehow associated with cognitive empathy, because I can 
experience bodily sensations simply by imagining things. In short then, cognitive 
empathy is essentially interpretive, simulational, and cognitively intertwined with the 
body schema. 
 
The Empathic Response 
In this section we will present our notion of the “empathic response,” an impulse 
to action based on the perceived internal states of others that I will argue is a central 
component of empathy itself. Our notion of empathic response is modelled after the 
Israeli philosopher and educator Khen Lampert’s notion of “radical compassion.” In his 
book Traditions of Compassion (2005), Lampert describes the “spontaneous aspect” of 
compassion. He writes:  
 
[C]ompassion…manifests itself as an impulse…[It] appears spontaneously, similar to the 
appearance of what we call ‘instinct’. That is, it appears automatically, completely 
unconnected to conscious will or desire, within a short, even infinitesimal, period of time, 
in the framework of the encounter with the distress of the other. Even in retrospect, no 
conscious discursive process can be discerned as preceding the appearance of 
compassion, nor the activation of the imagination (160-161). 
 
In the section above on embodied empathy, we saw a similar phenomenon with Preston 
and de Waal’s PAM, the description of which stated that the “activation” of the 
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representation of an action automatically “primes or generates” certain autonomic 
responses. The psychologist Liesbet Goubert and colleagues (Goubert et al. 2005; 2009) 
have also done studies to indicate that concern or sympathy often elicit the inclination 
towards caregiving. She calls such inclinations “automatic empathic responses.” She says 
that immediate pain expressions, such as screaming, crying, facial displays of pain, etc., 
are the kinds of behaviours that tend to elicit automatic empathic responses in observers. 
It would seem that people tend to respond automatically to the displays of pain of others 
– they inductively use the other’s behaviour to draw inferences about the internal 
experiences of others. These nonverbal expressions of pain tend to be particularly potent.    
  It would be inaccurate to provide an account of empathy as a relation without 
including empathic responses as part of this definition. Empathy would never have been 
selected if it did not elicit behaviours in others that were beneficial to individuals and 
groups. We therefore argue that helping behaviours are themselves part of empathy as a 
relation.  
 
Empathy: A Phenomenological Account 
We began this chapter by asserting that empathy is an innate predisposition that 
manifests itself as a social relation whereby one comes to feel as another feels, or 
becomes distressed by the suffering of another. This defined empathy as a biological 
predisposition that exists as part of the individual’s genetic architecture prior to any 
cultural conditioning. What was lacking in this definition was an account of exactly how 
empathy is made possible in our own daily experience, as well as a descriptive account of 
empathy as a relation between individuals. We will here elaborate on these two points. 
57 
 
 
 
Empathy is made possible by a number of factors, but the two most important 
conditions are what Merleau-Ponty calls intercorporeity, our existence as individuals on a 
shared physical plane of existence, and our bodies as analogous structures on this 
corporeal plane, our primordial attunement to one another’s bodies through mutual self-
recognition, or the correspondence of the same essential bodily components. What we 
called “embodied empathy” and “cognitive empathy” were not separate types of 
empathy, but two different expressions of what are essentially the same relation, that in 
which one feels for another, and/or feels with them; embodied empathy is manifested 
through the direct perception and/or mimicry of another’s body, whereas cognitive 
empathy is an indirect manifestation of the empathic relation whereby I simulate a real 
event in my own imagination. Both of these manifestations of empathy are ultimately 
rooted in the body – even when I imagine an event, I can still feel certain bodily 
sensations as if I am living an event in direct experience. We could also distinguish these 
two forms of empathy by identifying what initiates them; on the one hand, the empathic 
relation is initiated via direct perception, whereas on the other hand it is initiated by a 
simulation of direct perception. We finally discussed the empathic response, an impulse 
to action for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of the other. Empathy as a relation, 
then, is not just a feeling or a series of feelings, but is a feeling that initiates action for the 
ultimate cause of group cohesion. Empathy in this very narrow, instrumental sense could 
simply be defined as a feeling that initiates action. 
Having characterized empathy in a very general sense in terms of its origin and its 
everyday character, our sketch of empathy still seems somewhat scarce, as if we have 
landed just shy of its essence. Although we are intrinsically always already connected to 
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one another as members of a social species, as Merleau-Ponty has described in a 
stylistically pleasing, illuminating language, the fact remains that we are autonomous 
beings in the sense that we cannot essentially be anyone but ourselves – we are always 
within the confines of our own perspective, we experience the world from our own single 
standpoint. If another pricks her finger with a pin, no matter if I see it directly or if I try to 
imagine what it felt like, the fact remains that my own finger was not pricked with a pin. I 
can never step into the other’s world as I exist in my own; I am always on the “other” 
side of her existence, seeing her in a way that she can never see herself throughout her 
entire life. Empathy is like a doorway that I can never step through. I can see the other 
standing in a room that she has made for herself, I can make out the outlines of certain 
things and get an idea of what it might be like to stand in that room. But I can never 
actually step over into it and see things from where she does – I am forever outside of this 
room, standing in my own knowing that no one will ever be there beside me seeing what 
I see. But empathy alleviates this quasi-solipsistic condition of existence; it allows me to 
cross over, at least to a certain extent, into the other’s perspective. It is an emotional 
fusion of horizons. It allows us to take part in each other’s inner lives, albeit in a 
mediated way. It is a relation that momentarily allows separate individuals’ inner lives to 
“touch,” each by contaminating the other emotionally and thus summoning one 
individual to the aid of another. Empathy offers us an escape from our autonomy and 
provides us with a way of being together as opposed to being beside one another. This is 
what we would refer to as the essence of empathy. 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Empathy, Values and Sociology 
 As I mentioned in my introduction, the ultimate aim of  my thesis is twofold. 
First, it is my aim to circumvent a “value-free” approach to sociology whereby one can 
make use of empathy in sociological research both as a motivational tool and as a method 
of understanding in order to conduct research on behalf of the research subject in order to 
alleviate suffering and improve his quality of life; our version of Verstehen undermines 
Weber’s understanding of social science, since ours clearly possesses utility. Second, the 
demonstration of this argument will simultaneously  posit the foundation of an empathic 
sociology that focusses on alleviating the conditions of abject material suffering. We will 
return to this last point at the conclusion of this chapter. I will here present three central 
claims against Weber, that “empathy is not a value-judgement,” “empathy enhances 
understanding,” and that there is a certain “universalism” inherent in the process of 
empathy.  
 
Empathy is Not a Value Judgement 
 The first claim made by Weber that we isolated goes as follows: in the logical 
sense, statements of fact and value judgements represent two distinct categories. Science 
is concerned with the former but not with the latter because values are arbitrarily 
grounded in history and culture and therefore ultimately unverifiable. What this means is 
that the “value-axioms” that Weber discusses are inherited by individuals who grow up 
within the context of a certain cultural tradition. Because these value axioms are 
inhereted in the context of a particular time and place, they do not possess an absolute 
character, and so they are not “true” in the way that a statement of fact can be true. 
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Furthermore, because they are “should” claims, they do not refer to anything that exists in 
the present, and can therefore not be verified by observation. We respond to Weber’s 
claim with the proposition that empathy is not a value judgement. It is an evolutionarily 
given, biologically rooted predisposition that manifests itself as a relation and as a 
response to the suffering of others. It is therefore the manifestation of a biological 
imperative, not a cultural one, since it alerts us to the suffering of the other and allows us 
to understand the physical and emotional condition of the other in order to facilitate 
group life. The question of verification becomes irrelevant in the case of empathy 
because it exists prior to the “should” question in the form of an innate, pre-given 
imperative. For the same reason it cannot be said that empathy is a relation that is formed 
in the interests of a certain political agenda because, in its unfettered simplicitly and 
directness, it provides the empathic individual with the impulse to come to the aid of 
another. Therefore, because empathy itself is not a value judgement but is instead the 
manifestation of a pre-given biological imperative, it can be used to motivate the 
researcher without the intrusion of value judgements in the research process.  
This is not to say that one could not formulate a value judgement based on an 
empathic response. This is certainly possible. If I say to myself “I should help that 
person” who I see in distress, this is irrevocably a value judgement. But to say that 
empathy is the product of values that we already possess is to put the cart before the 
horse; we have seen in our analysis of empathy that the behavioural predispositions upon 
which it is based are present at birth. It is therefore much more plausible to suggest that 
empathy is a predisposition that exists prior to the influence of cultural values, than it is 
to suggest that it is itself a cultural value. In addition, we do not want to deny the claim 
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that values infringe upon the empathic process.  Goubert (2005; 2009) and Preston and de 
Waal (2002), for example, both suggest in their research that  there are a number of 
factors that can prevent empathic responses to individuals who are in distress. Most of 
these have to do with our capacity to reason. As we saw with Preston and de Waal, most 
empathic responses are fairly immediate and automatic. However, as we age, we often 
start to “think our way out of” empathic responses by considering other factors within a 
given situation that prevent us from fulfilling them. It is therefore certain that value-
judgements can impede empathic responses, or convert the individual’s propensity to 
empathy into something entirely different. There is thus much that can get in the way of 
someone manifesting an act of “pure” empathy for someone else. 
 Let us here recapitulate: empathy is the manifestation of a biological imperative, 
one that we are born with and that we end up cultivating or suppressing based on the 
cultural context in which we are raised. It compels us to form a relationship with the 
other by which we come to their aid, because empathy allows us to “share” in the 
suffering of the other. Unlike value axioms, the impulse toward the empathic response 
exists prior to the abstract level of ought statements as a biological imperative. It is a 
propensity that, if properly utilized, could act as the motivating force behind an empathic 
sociology that seeks to emancipate individuals from the conditions of abject material 
suffering. It is not a value judgement that obscures our vision, but rather an impulse that 
compels us to reconstruct society without the researcher having to compromise her 
scientific integrity. 
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Empathy Enhances Understanding 
We here want to respond to Weber’s second claim, that one should keep a 
personal distance between himself and the subejct of study. His account of empathic 
understanding implies that the researcher should somehow be able to use empathy to 
come to an emotional understanding of the research subject’s experience, a feat that 
would, in reality, inevitably create emotional linkages between the researcher and the 
research subject. Weber implicitly asks the sociologist to forego such ties, and any 
inclinations one might have to come to the aid of the other during the research process in 
the name of the higher epistemic value of value-neutrality. Bourdieu challenges Weber 
with an account of understanding that encourages such inclinations while at the same 
time remains scientific by accounting for the suffering of individuals with the larger 
social structures of which they are a part. Bourdieu’s notion of understanding would be 
central to the empathic sociology that we here wish to engender, because it uses empathy 
as a mode of understanding by which the sociologist can isolate the causes of material 
suffering.  
In 1999, Bourdieu published a book that was co-authored by several of his 
colleagues entitled The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society. 
The work is comprised of a number of different qualitative “case studies” that investigate 
the phenomenon of what Bourdieu calls “positional suffering,” or “ordinary” suffering, 
the kind that arises from the struggles and tensions inherent in one’s own social position. 
In order to accomplish this, he calls for a method that works with multiple perspectives, 
one that corresponds to a multiplicity of coexisting and competing points of view in the 
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world. He wishes to put forth a method that will objectivize its subjects, one that will not 
reduce  the individual under observation to “a specimen in a display case” (1999: 2).   
As a deliberate reference to Weber and the Verstehen tradition in early twentieth 
century German sociology, Bourdieu calls this method “understanding,” which is 
essentially an interview process in which one immerses oneself in the “story” of the 
interviewee. He claims that understanding as a method in sociology requires “taking 
people as they are” (1999: 1) In order to do this one must have the “theoretical 
instruments” that allow people to see human lives as necessary through a search for the 
causes and reasons that they have for being what they are. According to Bourdieu, the 
researcher must therefore adopt a perspective that as closely as possible resembles the 
subject’s own without becoming a subject of their worldview, which Bourdieu suggests is 
impossible anyway. In order not to exert a form of symbolic violence on the individuals 
under study, Bourdieu suggests that understanding should be thought of as a form of 
“active and methodical listening.” This method “combines a total availability to the 
person being questioned, submission to the singularity of a particular life history – which 
can lead, by a kind of more or less controlled imitation, to adopting the interviewee’s 
language, views, feelings, and thoughts – with methodical construction, founded on the 
knowledge of the objective conditions common to an entire social category” (609). In 
other words, if one already possesses a knowledge of the conditions under which a 
particular social group is living, one can then seek to comprehend the suffering of the 
individuals living under these conditions by an empathic adoption  of the perspective of 
the interviewee. Bourdieu argues that the only way to do this is “to impart to interviewees 
at the greatest social remove a feeling that they may legitimately be themselves, if they 
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know how to show these individuals…they are capable of mentally putting themselves in 
their place” (613). It is through this method that the researcher can attempt “to situate 
oneself in the place the interviewees occupy in the social space in order to understand 
them as necessarily what they are…” This means to grasp the social conditions of which 
individuals are the product, to possess an understanding of “the circumstances of life and 
the social mechanisms that affect the entire category to which any individual belongs…” 
Bourdieu  emphasizes the importance of such a method, insisting that not even the most 
extensive knowledge of a subject can bring about a true understanding of it “if it were not 
accompanied both by an attentiveness to others and a self-abnegation and openness rarely 
encountered in everyday life.” He stresses that the interview should be understood as a 
“spiritual exercise” that involves a “forgetfulness of self”  through which one can 
immerse oneself in the life of the interviewee as it is presented to the researcher. We 
could thus characterize Bourdieu’s notion of understanding as a kind of empathic 
conversation with the individual possessed by an “intellectual love” that allows one to 
fully accept the individual as she is.  
The method of understanding that Bourdieu outlines here  could be regarded as a 
variant of Weber’s notion of empathic understanding taken to its extreme, having the 
researcher immerse himself to the greatest possible extent in the research subject’s 
perspective. Instead of maintaining an emotional distance to clearly see the motivations 
of the subject, one instead experiences those emotions as much as possible as part of a 
full narrative of the individual’s life which they can then attach to their understanding of 
the larger social mechanisms that influence that individual’s life in order to understand 
how those structures determine individual lives. Bourdieu thus adds a new layer to 
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Weber’s approach that combines the latter’s subjectivist method of studying individual 
motivations with an objective understanding of the larger social structures that shape the 
research subject’s life. The notion of empathy that we outlined in the previous chapter 
could facilitate such an understanding in many different ways. Our perceptions of the 
interviewee’s body might allow us to understand the sources of his suffering through 
embodied empathy. As we would have to imagine many of the stories that he would tell 
us during an interview, cognitive empathy would be essential in understanding his 
experience. Our impulse to alleviate the suffering of the research subject would compel 
us to uncover the causes of the suffering that determine the context of his life.  We 
already know that Weber would be opposed to this last aspect of empathy as part of a 
sociological method. Although Bourdieu would not necessarily be opposed to it, he does 
mention that his method of understanding is focussed on what he calls “ordinary 
suffering.” He understands that his method might be criticized for taking the research 
focus away from “real” suffering, what we are calling abject material suffering. But he 
argues that using the latter as the sole measure of all suffering “keeps us from seeing and 
understanding a whole side of the suffering characteristic of a social order which, 
although it has undoubtedly reduced poverty overall…has also multiplied the social 
spaces…and set up the conditions for an unprecedented development of all kinds of 
ordinary suffering.” As sociologists, one must represent those places in the world where 
this type of suffering exists. In light of this difference, I would be tempted to modify 
Bourdieu’s method and use the knowledge one already has of the subject, as well as the 
narrative of the informant, to isolate the ultimate causes that engender the suffering of 
that individual. The researcher thus essentially works in the interests of those who 
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experience abject material suffering by attempting to isolate the ultimate causes of that 
suffering. The researcher then does not simply exploit empathy in order to gain 
understanding, but uses empathy as well as the relationships he has formed to fuel his 
quest to uncover the conditions of abject suffering. In response to Weber, then, we can 
ultimately conclude that empathic research by which one develops an intimate 
relationship with the subject can yield far more useful results than research done within a 
Weberian framework in which  the researcher, in the interest of value-neutrality, would 
ultimately be forced to ignore any compulsion one might have to come to the aid of 
another. Bourdieu’s method of understanding does not necessarily force one to quell such 
a compulsion, and it provides a much more useful framework in which to understand the 
suffering of the individual, since it could potentially link one to the causes of that 
suffering. Therefore, a variant of Bourdieu’s method would be indispensable for an 
empathic sociology. 
 
Empathy is Universal  
We here argue that empathy is a universal embodied imperative, a  biologically 
rooted impulse that is inscribed within the body schema prior to the abstraction of 
language; it is a pregiven predisposition that manifests itself as a relation in which one is 
oriented to the suffering of the other. This can be evinced by the fact that individual body 
schemas are always fundamentally open to communication with one another; they are the 
vehicles of a primordial language of which suffering is a part. It therefore corresponds to 
what is universal to all of us, the essentially corporeal language of the expression of 
bodily pleasure and pain. It is also an interpretive predisposition in that it allows the 
individual to try to grasp the internal states of another in order to understand that other so 
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that one might be compelled to help her. Using empathy one does not act because she is 
compelled to act at the behest of an ingrained value, but because she is compelled to act 
by an automatic inclination to the aid of the other. Given the evidence that has been 
collected, we can say in evolutionary terms empathy was selected because it greatly 
enhanced the chances of group survival. Although empathy is interpretive and thus prone 
to mistakes, it nonetheless yielded enough results to make it complimentary to 
reproductive success, otherwise we would not understand it to be a universal 
phenomenon. Empathy is the product of a universal  imperative, a prosocial impulse that 
has allowed usto survive as a group species. Prior to any cultural suggestion, it signals to 
us as individuals, at the corporeal level, that we ought to come to the aid of the other in 
order to alleviate her suffering. 
 In order to clearly restate our position, we here wish to put forth the claim that 
empathy is itself the manifestation of a universal embodied imperative, which is revealed 
by the fact that its object is what is common to all of us and what all of us seek to avoid – 
bodily and emotional suffering. There exist certain cultures that might accept or even 
encourage suffering in certain contexts, however this is always as a means to an end, a 
pathway to the attainment of what is perceived as a specific virtue within a specific 
cultural context. There is no one who wishes to starve for its own sake, who wishes to die 
of thirst or suffocation, who wants to exist amongst his fellow humans naked and without 
shelter and with the indignity and disrespect that this status brings; it is inconceivable that 
someone would wish any of this upon themselves, would desire the sum of these 
conditions for their own sake. The call to alleviate human suffering by altering the 
conditions of abject poverty is therefore a response to a wish that is common to us all, 
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which is to live in relative material comfort. We can therefore not justifiably say that the 
empathic response to alleviate suffering is a value judgement that infringes upon the 
objectivity of science and therefore does not yield “true knowledge” of the social order. 
We will now finalize our argument in the context of sociological research. 
 
 The purpose of this chapter was to articulate our thesis by responding to three 
arguments made by Weber argued about the relationship between facts and values in the 
social sciences. In this final section of the chapter, I want to clearly reiterate these 
arguments and articulate their response to Weber’s fact-value problem, as well as their 
relevance to sociological research in general. 
 First, in response to Weber’s claim that we cannot make value judgements in 
social science, we pointed to the fact that empathy is not a value judgement. What this 
ultimately means is that empathy is not a culturally transmitted value axiom that makes 
the claim that we ought to try, as often as possible, to alleviate the suffering of others for 
its own sake. We argued that empathy is a natural propensity to come to the aid of the 
other who is in distress, a propensity that can be either culturally suppressed or 
encouraged to different degrees in different situations. Ultimately, however, empathy as a 
predisposition is something that is given to us at birth by our very biology; as part of a 
“survival instinct” possessed by an intrinsically social, cooperative species, empathy 
summons us to respond to another’s suffering on its own, without being learned. The 
relevance of this argument in response to Weber is that, as Weber supposes, not all moral 
actions are the products of value judgements. This is relevant to sociological research 
because it brings to light a phenomenon that had never previously been considered as 
constitutive of human morality, at least not in the context of sociological research. The 
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latter has thus not only failed to account for this by assuming a groundless moral 
relativism in the study of human morality, but in doing so it has also failed to account for 
the phenomena that might affect the researcher in his research; value judgements are not 
the only things of moral relevance that we need to consider when conducting social 
research. Human morality is evidently much more complex than Weber presented to us 
as. 
 In chapter two we argued that empathy is an interpretive capacity in that it allows 
us to at least attempt to gain an understanding of the subjective experience of another. In 
this chapter we used the work of Bourdieu to expand this idea within a sociological 
context. We saw that Bourdieu essentially argues, in a very deliberate elaboration of 
Weber’s notion of understanding, that the researcher should empathically share in the 
recounted experience of the research subject, which of course involves an emotional 
closeness to that subject. Whereas the goal for Weber is to attend to the question of why 
individuals conduct certain behaviours, Bourdieu is ultimately seeking to link the 
behaviour and the suffering of others with the larger social structures that they are a part 
of, in order to answer the question of why people are who they are. The ultimate purpose 
of discussing Bourdieu was to juxtapose his method with Weber’s more modest claim 
that the researcher should maintain some personal and emotional distance from the 
subject in order to clearly understand his behaviour. Bourdieu’s method suggests a 
personal and emotional closeness to the subject, which presents empathy as an invaluable 
interpretive device which can aid in understanding how the social structures of which 
they are a part shape the individuals within them. We also argued that, at the same time 
that Bourdieu’s method could be used to understand the relationship between an 
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individual’s social position and the social forces that shape it, so too could such a process 
be used to uncover the conditions of that individual’s suffering. Empathy therefore not 
only motivates us to come to the aid of the subject, but so too does it allow us to 
understand it with an eye to changing it. 
 Finally, we put forth the claim that empathy is an embodied universal  imperative 
which “states” that all should be free from the bodily and the social suffering that is the 
consequence of abject material poverty. The reason for making this claim, we said, is that 
empathy is an innate response to human suffering that exists prior to values at the level of 
universal human corporeality. There thus exists a primordial “language of the body” or 
“language of suffering” that stems ultimately from the intersubjective nature of the body 
schema, and can thus act as a signal to others that they are in need of aid, which 
subsequently activates empathy as a response in others. We again juxtaposed this with 
Weber’s moral relativism since empathy, as an embodied  imperative that responds to the 
suffering of others prior to making value judgements, takes place on a level that 
“equalizes” us, as we are all subject to the same physical conditions. There thus exists no 
one who could reasonably make the claim that they would want to impose that kind of 
suffering and the conditions that perpetuate it upon themselves. Since we are all subject 
to the same physical conditions, and we cannot wish the conditions of abject suffering 
upon ourselves, then it follows that we cannot reasonably excuse its imposition upon 
anyone else, as they are the same as us in that they are living human bodies. Empathy 
therefore undermines Weber’s moral relativism because it reveals an embodied or 
“biological”  imperative intrinsic to living human bodies which cannot be said to be 
relative to a cultural value system. It is rather universally grounded in our biology, and so 
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this makes it possible to include  empathy within the purview of sociological research, 
since as we saw empathy can not only motivate research but also enhance understanding. 
We thus “overcome” the limitations of the fact value distinction.  
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Conclusion 
 In an empathic sociology, empathy would ultimately have two purposes. One is 
that it would act as the motivation for using research in order to progressively reconstruct 
society. As a researcher of abject poverty, one would witness the destitution of 
individuals on a regular basis. Assuming that one is empathetic toward these individuals, 
that is, provided that one felt for and/or felt with these individuals, it follows that one 
would be compelled to help them, to try to relieve the conditions that greatly hamper their 
quality of life. As one might notice, empathy is not a value judgement, although it could 
be the emotional basis for one. It is a compulsion that arises from an openness between 
two individuals whereby one experiences an emotion similar to the one that the research 
subject is experiencing, or experiences undesirable emotions as a result of seeing an 
individual in such a condition. One thus seeks to rid one’s self of this emotion by coming 
to the aid of the other. Empathy is therefore the motivation for conducting research that 
seeks to uncover the causes of abject material suffering with the aim of altering those 
conditions. It motivates the researcher because it allows one to experience another’s 
suffering as one’s own, and therefore becomes motivated to relieve that suffering. This is 
not a value judgement – it is a compulsion that comes out of an emotional state that 
involves the result of perceiving another’s suffering. 
 On the other hand, empathy can also be a form of understanding. As we saw with 
Bourdieu, empathy can be invaluable in understanding the other’s experience. If one fully 
understands the other’s experience, if one can effectively “be” another, then, coupled 
with a knowledge of the society in which one lives, one could hypothetically isolate the 
causes that initially led to that individual’s suffering. If one can find the causes of 
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suffering, then one can theoretically develop strategies with which to alter the conditions 
of those causes. Therefore, just as empathy can be the motivation behind conducting 
useful research, so too can it be used to provide an understanding of abject material 
suffering and its causes, an understanding that provides sociology with the utility that it 
so often lacks. Such is the foundation of an empathic sociology. 
For reasons that I think are obvious, this research can also be regarded as a 
contribution to the literature on social suffering. What is central to this literature in a 
practical sense is the intention for research to inform social policy. It would certainly be 
part of the aim of an empathic sociology to do this as well. I think that empathic 
sociology is also a kind of public sociology, since it works in the service of publics that 
are all members of a marginalized group of individuals who are often unable to help 
themselves, or find immense obstacles when they try to do so. A sociology of this kind 
would not be “public” in the same way that Agger or Burawoy would like it to be public. 
It is public in the sense that sociologists would work in the service of certain publics, 
attempting to alter the material conditions of life for those who are unable to do so 
without aid. I am therefore critical of public sociology in its current form because it 
advocates the impossible dream of a public sphere; those who have been imprisoned in 
the shackles of abject material suffering presumably do not possess the means by which 
to engage in public debate, or even to clearly understand the issues to begin with. 
Although individuals may be equal in their potential to discuss public issues, society has 
deprived them of the means to exercise such a potential. In my mind, it is far more 
important that we alter the conditions of the society that we currently have before we try 
to get marginalized groups to participate in political discussions. Their voices are, after 
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all, just as human as anyone else’s, but they are not necessarily equipped to formulate 
cogent opinions and project them in an understandable way. It is the role of the empathic 
sociologist to advocate a form of society in which we all possess the means to grasp and 
to discuss the issues that affect all of us.   
 It should be understood that my intention in writing this is not to try to dodge the 
“problem” of values in social scientific research. Even in the model of sociological 
research that I put forth, there will still be value judgements entering the field of research, 
perhaps even on a regular basis. This is inevitable – Agger certainly accepts this 
inevitability. What needs to be understood and accepted by all researchers engaged in 
social research of any kind is that Weber’s model for a “valueless” social science is not 
only outdated, but it was fundamentally incorrect to begin with. It begins with the 
assumption that the natural sciences, in order to be what one could legitimately call a 
science, do not make value judgements, an assumption that is fundamentally false and is 
made based on a misunderstanding of the scientific method. It further disregards the 
distinction between “basic” and “applied” research, as well as the fact that both types of 
research are central to the natural sciences; if basic research did not have applied 
research, the pursuit of knowledge would be a completely useless one, and applied 
research without basic research would not have nearly the amount of knowledge at their 
disposal that they currently do. Both types of research are saturated with and directed by 
different types of value judgements, and to say otherwise is to admit of being in a state of 
active self-delusion. There can no longer be any doubt that value-judgements are central 
both to the natural and the social sciences. The question has become one of how it is that 
we best manage them in particular contexts. 
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 All of this being said, I do not want to suggest that I am completely 
unsympathetic to sustaining what might be called a more traditional kind of sociology. As 
I have already said, basic research is central to any scientific endeavour, and it is this kind 
of research to which the long tradition of various sociological methods are invaluable. I 
think what the main fear is on this side of the debate is that sociology will be reduced to a 
kind of politics, in which case it could no longer be called a scientific endeavour. I think 
there is some truth to this, which is why I do not subscribe to the views of either Agger or 
Burawoy on this point. In relation to Agger’s viewpoint, I am not sure if I agree with the 
contention that all forms of knowledge are equally legitimate or illegitimate, making the 
sociologist one who is “among equals” when attending to public issues. I am also not sure 
that I agree with Burawoy’s opposing claim (although implicit) that the sociologist holds 
a kind of special, elite position in such affairs. In Agger’s case, the sociologist becomes 
another citizen among many with a particular perspective, and in Burawoy’s case he 
becomes a kind of mediator who holds privileged information that may or may not hold 
solutions to problems of public significance. In both of these hypothetical instances, the 
sociologist has stepped outside of the university framework and has entered the realm of 
politics (in the public as opposed to the institutional sense of the word). This leads one to 
ask why the sociologist cannot simply engage in this kind of activity outside of or in 
addition to one’s own career.  
 The intent behind the solution that I have offered here is similar to that of 
Burawoy in that it is essentially diplomatic in nature; rather than constructing a “division 
of labour” in which each sociologist, regardless of what “camp” she is in, can hold a 
place that is mutually beneficial to every other, I sought to present a way to overcome 
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Weber’s value problem in a way that would not give rise to political contention. My 
strategy was to posit an imperative grounded at the level of our shared human biology 
that was therefore incontestable, and could not be said to be culturally arbitrary. If such 
an imperative exists (which I of course believe it does), then one can attend to a kind of 
public sociology without having to sacrifice the integrity of the scientific method by 
perceiving the data that they collect through the lens of their own value judgements. In 
addition, an empathic sociology attends to what is arguably one of the most fundamental 
problems of a society, that being poverty. If the natural sciences are validated by the 
technologies that they allow us to create in order to live longer, healthier and more 
pleasurable lives, then sociology must be validated by the societies that it allows us to 
create for the same reasons, if it is to be considered useful for humanity. Such validation 
must begin with the pursuit of acting to eliminate the kind of abject suffering that 
prevents people from living lives beyond the struggle to make ends meet, and strips them 
of their ability to participate in public life as citizens of a democracy, and of the dignity 
that is supposed to come with simply being human. There exist no other issues as 
fundamental as this one, since its effects manifest themselves at the most basic level of 
the body, and point to needs that must be satisfied before any other aspects of life can be 
attended to. Sociological research has the capacity to conduct research that seeks to 
alleviate such conditions, and to prevent it from doing so based on a false pretense of 
scientificity would be as hypocritical as it would be unjust.       
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